




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DRUGGIST, NELSONVILLE,  
QUEBEC.

# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# CHEVALIER DE JOHNSTONE.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH  
MS. OF THE CHEVALIER.

BY

CHARLES WINCHESTER,

ADVOCATE, ABERDEEN.

VOLUME THIRD.


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MEMOIRS  
OF  
THE CHEVALIER DE JOHNSTONE.

Volume Third.

THE WAR IN CANADA

(Campaign of 1759);

DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD BETWEEN M. THE MARQUIS OF MONTCALM, WHO COMMANDED THE ARMY IN CANADA, UNDER THE ORDERS OF M. THE MARQUIS OF VAUDREUIL, AND M. WOLFE, GENERAL OF THE ENGLISH ARMY, BOTH KILLED THE 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1759, IN THE BATTLE BEFORE QUEBEC; OR AN IMPARTIAL AND MILITARY EXAMINATION OF THAT CAMPAIGN, TO SERVE AS A JUSTIFICATION OF M. THE MARQUIS OF MONTCALM.



MONTCALM.—“It is singular, Sir, that my shade has not again met yours since the time that I descended into this region, where I have followed you so closely. It is no fault to have searched for you from a desire on my part to enter with you upon discussion of the operations of a campaign which has proved so fatal to both of us.”

Wolfe.—“I have no less desire than you, Sir. One of my compatriots, who died two days after the affair of the 13th, apprized me that there had not been more than some hours of interval between your destiny and mine. He added some

details regarding this event; but as he was but very imperfectly informed, and as I myself was very ignorant of things relative to the operations preceding that day, I desired much to have a conversation with you upon these subjects; so much the more, that the details that different persons have communicated to me of both nations, which have come, whether from Europe or America, have always been very imperfect: and I am enchanted that, after having made so many useless efforts to meet you, chance at last produces this happy result."

*Montcalm.*—"Will you permit me, Sir, before our conversation becomes more serious, to make one reflection upon the difference of lot which we have experienced, comparing the one with the other. They have rendered to you the greatest honours. Your body has been transported to London with magnificence, and deposited in Westminster Abbey, among those of kings. The English nation has erected to you a superb mausoleum; and your name, dear to Englishmen, and continually in their mouths, is pronounced with the greatest praises. But as for me, what sensation has my death made! The Canadians and savages, who knew the uprightness of my soul, and my devotedness for my king and country, are the only ones who have done me justice, if you except a small number of friends who, not daring to oppose the torrent, were forced in secret to shed some tears upon my tomb."

*Wolfe.*—"In this region, where there exists no longer prejudice, I confess with frankness, that I have found your lot preferable to mine, notwithstanding the injustice you have experienced, for the most part, from your countrymen; you have been regretted, and your memory has been exculpated by all those who are capable of appreciating your talents and your eminent qualifications, and who have sufficient probity and disinterestedness to render their homage. Why not take the testimony of my army to your account? Your virtues, and, above all, your humanity for prisoners, have gained you



the hearts of all my soldiers. They have not seen, but with gratitude and veneration, the care you took to stay the hands of the savages, when these barbarians prepared to slaughter them, in order to make of them a horrible banquet; and I have known, that whereas they have refrained tears at my death, they have shed bitter ones on being informed of yours. I do not see in this mausoleum but a proof of a foolish weakness in men; what avails this block of marble to my actual state? The monument remains, the conqueror has disappeared. This testimony in your favour, joined to that of true judges in the art of war, and that of gentlemen in your own country, is far above the empty honours which are bestowed by the populace, who judge of things by the events, and, besides, are incapable of analyzing operations. The greater part did not know me before the attack on this colony; and if fortune, to which I owe almost all my success, had favoured me less, perhaps I should have been the victim of this blind and impassioned people. The multitude have not, and cannot have, but success to regulate their opinions."

*Montcalm.*—"I am very much flattered, Sir, by your manner of thinking with regard to me. Let us leave human weakness to produce errors upon errors, and to praise to the skies to-day what they will condemn to-morrow. It is now that we can contemplate at leisure the errors and the passions of men, which rush like the waves of the sea to dash and often break themselves in pieces upon the rocks; and since the mist, which hitherto had concealed from our eyes part of the truth, is cleared away, and as you have very justly remarked, we are located in a region where they are divested of all prejudice, would you be quite willing that we should examine without partiality the operations of that campaign of 1759, equally fatal to the conqueror and the vanquished, and what was the epoch of the loss of Canada to France."

*Wolfe.*—"I agree to it, Sir, and to testify to you all my willingness, I confess to you frankly, that I have been greatly

surprised at having been able to arrive with the English fleet quite opposite to the town of Quebec, without having had to encounter the slightest opposition in the river St. Lawrence."

*Montcalm.*—"You have reason, Sir; it is not my fault that you did not meet with obstacles in your way; I proposed to make a redoubt and battery on Cape Tourmento, opposite the passage at the end of the Isle of Orleans. The ships are obliged to approach the Cape at the distance of a hundred toises, to enter into the bay. It is a rock of about fifty feet in height, by consequence a shelter to the guns of our vessels; and, besides, it is a position so advantageous that your troops should have never been able to approach from any side to form the siege, this rock being steep all around, and almost perpendicular; thus it is very likely that the first four ships which should have presented themselves to enter the passage would have been sunk to the bottom by the fire plunging from this redoubt. I had also the idea of making a battery upon the highest point of the peak which is opposite to the Isle at Condre, which would have raked your vessels in their advance from the rear, while they approached the anchorage, being obliged to cast anchor to wait the return of the ebb tide, or to be carried along and dashed upon the shallow coast by the excessive violence of the currents at low water. I had even sent the engineers to examine these positions. I proposed this project for the part of the river below Quebec, but I did not command a chief who was capable of executing it."

*Wolfe.*—"It is true, Sir, that this would have occasioned us a great embarrassment, and in a small degree retarded our operations for some time."

*Montcalm.*—"It was fully my intention, because I was always sensible how fortunate it is to gain time in certain positions; above all in a climate such as Canada, where the fine season is so short, that one cannot there maintain the campaign, owing to the excessive cold which prevails at Quebec from the month of May even to the commencement

of October; and your fleet did not arrive at the Isle at Condre till the end of June."

*Wolfe*.—"Certainly, Sir, we arrived in the river St. Lawrence by far too late by six weeks. This is the ordinary fate of all grave naval armaments and expeditions. The fleets are almost never in a state to depart on the day named; and this is the cause which makes enterprises by sea so often miscarry, the least delay being dangerous and of the last consequence, by giving the enemy time to reconnoitre and make the necessary preparations for defence."

*Montcalm*.—"I will not conceal from you, Sir, that I have always regarded the disposition which you made of your army, after your landing before Quebec, as diametrically opposed to the first principle of the military art! It appears to me that this is an axiom recognized—that an army ought to be disposed in such a manner as to be able promptly to reunite, and to sustain itself reciprocally in all its parts. You had divided your army into three camps—one of which on Point Levis, another upon the Isle of Orleans, and the third at the Fall of Montmorency—in such a manner that the communications of one camp with the other were cut off by two arms of the river St. Lawrence, formed by the Isle of Orleans, and every one of which was six hundred toises in breadth. Your position was like that of the French at the siege of Turin when the Duke of Orleans proposed to leave the lines to fight the enemy; and it would not have been difficult to attack your separated camps to triumph without difficulty, as Prince Eugene did at Turin; your two most considerable camps—that at Point Levis, and that at the Fall of Montmorency—being at the distance of two leagues from each other, and separated by two arms of the river. Your position was such that if we had fallen with our army upon any one of your three camps, at our option, you would have been destroyed and overwhelmed before it would have been possible for your other camps to arrive to your succour.

How could you be able to rest tranquilly and without trouble in a position so perilous during more than two months?" \*

*Wolfe.*—"And you, Sir, what hindered you to execute that which appeared to you so easy?"

*Montcalm.*—"We attempted it, but with bad success. Some days after our landing at Point Levis, we sent M. Dumas, major of the troops of the colony, with a detachment of five hundred men, who in the night crossed the river opposite Quebec, without having been discovered by your advanced posts, in order to fall upon your camp at Point Levis; but scarcely were they disembarked and in march to attack you, than a panic terror so overcame them, that disorder then ensued, they fired the one upon the other, and betook themselves immediately to flight in the greatest possible confusion, to rejoin their boats. Discouraged by this bad beginning, they never spoke again of attacking your camps, and it was decided that they should stand solely upon the defensive."

*Wolfe.*—"It appeared to me, however, that you were not encamped in a manner to remain on the defensive, since your army did not amount but to ten thousand men, and that your camp occupied a space of from two to three leagues."

*Montcalm.*—"I am convinced of it, and I feel with you that a line too much extended is too weak in all its parts; I am very much convinced by proof of this principle, and even that it is a recognized maxim when they are not able to pre-

\* To know how to choose advantageous positions for encamping is one of the talents the most essential for a general of an army. "He who has the conduct of an army," says a Chinese general, "ought not to trust to others a choice of that importance. He ought to do something more still. If he is truly able, he ought to be able to dispose of even the encampment and all the marches of his enemy. A great general does not wait till he make him go: he knows how to make him come. If you find in sallying that the enemy seeks to render himself precisely to the places where you just wish him to be, make in sallying also smooth for him all the difficulties, and deliver him from all the obstacles which he could encounter. The great science is to make him do all you wish him to do, and to supply to him, without his perceiving it, all the means of aiding you."

vent a line from being forced, and I believe it equally impossible to prevent the defeat of an enemy when they have many leagues of coast to guard: he who attacks with all his force united and concentrated on a single point; on the contrary, he who relies upon his force separated through the whole length of his lines; and one cannot know where the enemy may make his real attack, since he is master of choosing the place which he inclines. Thus it is evident that when one makes feint attacks to threaten at once the whole extent of the line, it is necessary that a column, forty or fifty men deep, should penetrate an intrenchment, where it would scarcely be possible to have two ranks of soldiers. It is the same as to landings, notwithstanding the common opinion that it is possible to prevent them, and I do not know a better course to adopt than to have a flying body of troops to fall upon the enemy with the bayonet at the end of the musket before there are a great many on the land, and before they could have formed after the confusion which necessarily occurs in getting out of their boats. My plan of defence was to occupy the heights of Abraham, to encamp there, and to make the city of Quebec serve as a pivot to all my movements, seeing the fate of Canada depended on the capture of that city; in this view, I would have made intrenchments along the banks of the river St. Charles, I would have remained encamped on these heights fully two days before your arrival. The person in my army in whom I always placed the greatest confidence, on account of his merit and knowledge, proposed to change our position by supporting our left by the fall of Montmorency, and our right by the river St. Charles, making, as you have remarked regarding it, a camp of an extent of two leagues. He pretended, that on showing a large front, this apparent boldness would impose upon the enemy. As there is not a point of moral certainty in any operation of war, the least unforeseen incident being capable of overturning the best concerted plan, I sacrificed my own opinion to his, with-

out being satisfied. In that new position, M. Levis commanded the left and fall of Montmorency, I had the centre at Beauport, and M. the Marquis of Vaudreuil the right, opposite Canardiere, which was the head-quarters."

*Wolfe.*—"If you had remained upon the heights of Abraham, it is most likely that you would have prevented the capture of Quebec, but you would have left me at liberty to ruin and devastate the country."

*Montcalm.*—"That may be so, but the Colony would not have been taken, and you would not have dared to penetrate into the interior of the country, leaving Quebec behind you. If you had attempted to attack me, I had for my advantage the heights, which I would have fortified by intrenchments, and by a chain of redoubts, even to Cape Rouge, which is about two leagues in a straight line from Quebec, and which would have been an advanced post for me, difficult to force by its advantageous position; and I would have had for my doorway the succour of the town, by which my army would have been supported. I never could have imagined that it could have been your idea to reduce Quebec to ashes, the greater part of that city having been destroyed entirely by the fireworks and bombs which you had thrown from your batteries on the other side of the river. It appears to me that when you intend to take a city with the intention of keeping it, you ought to turn it to its proper use, in order to have in place of a mass of ruins, houses to lodge your army in. Besides, the destruction of that city would not have accelerated the capture in any manner. In the first place, you could not have dismounted our batteries, which were much more elevated than yours; and, in short, the river which was between you and the city, and which was six hundred toises broad, would not have permitted you to approach it. What advantage could you then expect from that manœuvre?"

*Wolfe.*—"My inaction during the whole course of the summer ought to have made you sufficiently acquainted with

my embarrassment, and the little hope I had of success in my enterprise; and the destruction of Quebec in a mass to the foundation, as it would have been in effect, would have appeared, in the eyes of the English people, a considerable advantage gained over your army, whom it behoved necessarily to blind, to allay their passions."

*Montcalm.*—"The day, Sir, that you landed at the fall of Montmorency, and when you encamped there with a corps of four thousand men, you were apparently ignorant that the river Montmorency was fordable in the wood, at half a league from your camp, where fifty men could have passed in front. In passing, all at once, this ford, you would have been able to fall unperceived upon the left of our camp, and to have cut us in pieces before it could have been possible for us to assemble a sufficient force] to be able to present you a front capable of arresting you, for we were in full security, ignorant ourselves that there was a ford of this river, and we were not informed of it till some hours after your landing."

*Wolfe.*—"It is, then, not extraordinary that I should have been ignorant of it. Besides, it is only the inhabitants of the vicinity of rivers, morasses, and ponds who can give information as to that, and all those of that quarter had fled and retired into your camp. On my arrival I did not find a single person; and when I had found one, your Canadians were too much attached and too much devoted to their King and their country to have given me the least light on the subject. Those whom we sent to reconnoitre could not do it but very superficially, if they confined themselves to their own proper observations, without interrogating the people of the surrounding country."

*Montcalm.*—"During the time your soldiers were occupied in laying out your camp, and putting up their tents, M. Levis found himself before the fall, with M. Johnstone, his aide-de-camp, who investigated your manœuvre. The aide-de-camp having asked at M. Levis if he was certain that there was not

a ford in the river Montmorency, upon the positive reply of M. Levis 'that he was assured that there was not one, since he had himself reconnoitered this river up to a lake and morass at two or three leagues in front of the woods, out of which it arose, without ever finding one,' an inhabitant, who heard them, immediately whispered into the ear of the aide-de-camp, 'That the General deceived himself, that there was a ford, and that the inhabitants daily passed this river on foot to carry corn to the mill.' M. Johnstone imparted it immediately to M. Levis, but the inhabitant having been interrogated somewhat roughly by M. Levis, expressed himself in a voice so timid and trembling that M. Levis could not persuade himself that he was deceived in his observations. On leaving the fall to return to the lodging of M. Levis, M. Johnstone gave orders to the countryman to find immediately some one who had passed the ford within twenty-four hours, and to bring him with diligence with him to the house of M. Levis. The Canadian returned in a moment to find M. Johnstone, followed by a man who had passed the night before with a sack of corn on his back, and who declared that he had found the water not above his mid-leg. We sent, immediately, a detachment to occupy this post, with tools to make intrenchments on the spot."

*Wolfe.*—"If I had been as fortunate as you, Sir, to discover the ford, I would have fallen upon your army at the instant; for certainly I should not have let escape so fine an occasion to distinguish myself. There is nothing so perilous as the proximity of rivers or morasses, when they are not sounded and examined with the greatest attention. A mishap which occurred to one of my brother officers, Lieutenant-General Cope, proves sufficiently the necessity of sounding, with all the care and all the circumspection possible, the rivers and the morasses which are found in the neighbourhood of a camp. M. Cope, who passed for one of the best officers of England, was sent to Scotland in 1745 to command an



army against Prince Edward. He chose a position the most advantageous to wait for the rebels. He had on his right two enclosures, with stone walls seven or eight feet in height, between which there was a road from fifteen to eighteen feet broad, which led to the village of Prestonpans. Before his front was another enclosure, surrounded by a ditch full of water, twelve feet broad and very deep. At his left there was a pond and a morass which he believed to be impracticable; and behind him the sea, which shut him up in the best fortified camp. The proprietor of the morass informed Prince Edward that there was a place which he had often crossed whenever he chose, but that there could not pass more than a single man abreast. Prince Edward, sending at once to reconnoitre this morass, found that it was unguarded, crossed it during the night with his army, making them defile, the one after the other; and at the break of day M. Cope saw the Highlanders a hundred feet before him, sword in hand, who fell unexpectedly upon his army, without leaving them time to put themselves in battle-array. All his troops were in an instant shamefully cut in pieces or made prisoners, and it was the strength of his camp that proved his ruin. With difficulty could he save himself, with a score of horsemen to carry into England the news of his own disgrace, covered with dishonour, shame, and confusion. His misadventure has always made such a great impression upon me that I have been continually upon my guard against a like surprise; and at the same time I have always sought to profit by the negligence of the enemy in that respect. Thus, it is greatly to be presumed that I should have discovered the ford during the march, and then I should not have been found wanting to take advantage of it."

*Montcalm.*—"But, Sir, how do you justify yourself for the imprudence with which you ensconced yourself in the wood, with two thousand men quite opposite to our intrenchments at the ford; not a single man of your detachment would

have been able to escape ; nine hundred savages in ambuscade, within pistol shot of you, without your having perceived it, would have invested and cut off your retreat. The savages had sent at the instant their officer, M. Langlade, to inform M. Levis of their position, and to beg him with clasped hands to give orders to M. Repentigny, who commanded a corps of eleven hundred men in the intrenchments at the ford, to cross the river with his detachment ; and that they would answer with their heads for the success of the attack ; adding that you appeared to be about two thousand men, and that they were not strong enough to attack you without reinforcements, which they asked from the Canadians. There were a great many officers in the house of M. Levis when Langlade arrived, among others, commanders of battalions. M. Levis consulted them, but no one officer gave it as his opinion for the detachment of Repentigny to pass the river ; they pretended that it was dangerous to attack an enemy in woods, of which it was impossible to know the number, that perhaps this was the whole English army ; and that it would be impossible to engage in a general action without being prepared ; that if we had the misfortune to be repulsed, M. Levis would be blamed for taking this affair upon himself without waiting for orders ; they alleged, besides, many other reasons equally less solid. Never did any one see such a blindness ! M. Johnstone was the only one who gave an opposite advice, and maintained with spiritedness that there was not the least appearance that this was the whole English army, since the savages, who never failed to exaggerate the number of the enemy, supposed them only two thousand men ; that although this should be the whole English army, and that we should engage in a general action in the woods, that was all that we could desire as most fortunate, since one Canadian in the wood was worth much more than three soldiers of regular troops, and that one soldier on the plain was worth more than three Canadians, of whom the greater part of our army was

composed ; and that it was necessary to suit and make the different kinds of troops, of which our army was composed, available ; that, without losing time, it was necessary to send to Beauport to inform M. Montcalm to cause the army to advance at once in echelons, replacing the post of M. Repentigny at the ford by the Royal Regiment Roissillon, which was encamped close to that, and thus to stop the army, always advancing in proportion as they passed the ford ; that even supposing that the worst should happen, that we should be repulsed, the English could not reap any advantage from it, since we should have a secure retreat in the thickness of the woods, where the enemy never durst pursue us, at the risk of being cut to pieces by the savages and the Canadians ; and he added that in war when fortune presented to us propitious moments, it was necessary to profit by them on the instant. These reasonings made no impression, and Langlade was sent back without having obtained anything. The ambuscade of the savages was a little more than half a league from the house of M. Levis ; in the meantime, Langlade returned once more to give us instant news on the part of the savages. M. Levis did not wish ever to give a positive order to M. Repentigny to pass the river with his detachment, but he charged Langlade with a letter on his part to Repentigny, in which he notified to him the confidence he had in his prudence, and that he could pass the ford with his detachment, to join himself to the savages, if he saw a likelihood to succeed. M. Johnstone foreseeing the answer M. Repentigny would make, he said to M. Levis, in sealing his letter, that Repentigny had too much good sense and judgment to take upon himself so delicate an affair. Accordingly, he sent at once to demand from M. Levis an order more positive and more clear. M. Levis in the end determined on it, and mounted his horse to proceed to the ford, in order to give his orders *viva voce* ; but scarcely was he on-half the road than he heard a fire of musketry. The time having

slipped away in indecision ; the savages impatient at having remained more than an hour in a position so perilous, let go their shot, killing five hundred men, and retiring immediately without having lost a single man. It is evident that had M. Repentigny passed the ford with his detachment, you would have been cut in pieces, and accordingly, to all appearance, this action would have determined for ever the war in Canada, your army not having anything further to expect after such a loss. Never did fortune seem to decide so favourably for you, and it seems that the ruin of Canada was also decided in the decrees of Providence. As to the rest we cannot blame M. Levis. Every subordinate officer, is in rule when he executes the orders he receives, much more when he sees daily officers who are victims in having even followed orders badly expressed and convertible into a double sense. One is not wrong in being mistrustful in similar cases, where the honour and reputation of an officer is engaged. The human mind is too limited to foresee the result of an affair, and when the success does not respond to an enterprise, even well conceived and with all appearances of succeeding, one finds but too many people who cover themselves under the shelter of censure, which they have merited by their ignorance and want of capacity, profiting thereby to destroy and sacrifice innocent victims, while they themselves, who are really incapable, escape the punishment they deserve."

*Wolfe.*—"My intention, of advancing so closely to your intrenchments at the ford, was to see if there was any means of forcing them, and in effect they appeared to me to be of little consequence ; but the sole view of the stirring ground imposed respect. Besides, accustomed to war in Europe, could I imagine the bravery of your savages ambuscaded so close to me, unless I had discovered them?"

*Montcalm.*—"Your attack, Sir, on the 31st July, at a place the most inaccessible of our camp, has always to me appeared inconceivable. From Quebec to Beauport is a flat

and uniform country, and close to the source of the river, From Beauport to the Fall of Montmorency, the country insensibly rises; and at the redoubt and battery which M. Johnstone had erected, which was your landing and point of attack, it formed, as you know, a mountain very steep and sharp, which your soldiers would have had great difficulty in scaling, even without the encumbrance of their accoutrements. But supposing that they had been able to mount, which they would not have been able to do, but at the loss of three-fourths of your force, before arriving at the summit, the height serving us as a very steep glacis, you would have still found, upon the crest of the height, a very solid intrenchment and well flanked, which M. Johnstone had traced and conducted, the fire of which from the front and the flanks would have made a butchery of your soldiers, as soon as ever you had been engaged in the ascent. Besides these difficulties, the ground between the redoubt of Johnstone and the foot of the acclivity, was marshy, where one sunk considerably. Your Scotch Highlanders would have broke through this barrier, and would have advanced even to the foot of the ascent, but they could not have escaped out of it. I was a long time before I was able to persuade myself that this was your real attack. I always feared for the loop-hole, and if you had found it there, opposite the house of M. Vaudreuil, and a feint attack where you had made your real one, you would have easily penetrated into the country by entering it on plain ground; and you would have cut our army in two through the centre, unless the different corps could have been easily able to join themselves: you would have compassed the ruin of Beauport, which you would have taken all at once, under shelter of being attacked by the left of our camp; and by your prolonging your line on the side of Quebec, and forcing our horn work, which upon that side it would have been possible to scale by a *coup de main*, you would have been in an instant masters of the Heights of Abraham, even

to have turned against us the intrenchments which I had made on the banks of the river St. Charles, which would not have been available by changing our position ; and our communication being cut off from the city by that manœuvre, you would have been able to form the siege without fear of being annoyed. Behold, Sir, what I continually apprehended ; and if you had taken this course, I do not know indeed, how we would have been able to extricate ourselves. M. Levis seeing your attack determined against M. Johnstone's redoubt, caused his troops prudently to retire, which were there inside, which would not have been able to resist a shock of your army. It was then, Sir, that miracles came to our aid, and greatly *apropos*. As soon as you were at the redoubt, at the point of seeing the difficulty of the ascent, but engaged in a bad mode of proceeding, so as not to be able to extricate yourselves but by the loss of half your army ; at this critical moment a tempest arose, so great as to screen you all at once from our view, we not being able to see more than two paces from our intrenchments. When the tempest ceased, it was then that we saw again your army which deployed in column towards your camp at the Fall of Montmorency, for the purpose of passing the ford of that river, close to the bank of the river, which they did at low water. You profited, Sir, like an able man, by this event to secure your retreat ; and certainly you must have been content to escape, though with the loss of five or six hundred men."


*Wolfe*.—"I confess I was deceived with regard to that height. In the distance it appeared inconsiderable ; and it was only at the redoubt that the escarpment developed itself, and appeared truly such as it is. I commenced at seven o'clock in the morning, to open my battery of forty pieces of cannon, of twenty-four pounders, at the Fall of Montmorency, as well as my mortars and howitzers. The "Centurion" ship of war, of sixty guns, and two small frigates, brought their broadsides to bear, at the same time, against your intrenchments,

which kept up a continual fire like platoons of musketry; which I continued so from my batteries up to six o'clock in the evening, when I commenced my landing at low water. I daresay no one ever saw artillery better served. I imagine that this terrible cannonade, which continued without intermission throughout the whole day, intimidated the Canadian militia, of which your army was principally composed, and caused them abandon their intrenchments. My batteries, at the Fall, being from twenty-five to thirty feet more elevated than your camp, we saw your force in the intrenchments, even to the buckles of their shoes; so it is not possible but that you must have lost an infinite number of men."

*Montcalm.*—"This is what ought to form the eulogy of that brave militia. Not a single man gave way; all conducted themselves with as much courage and ardour as my regular troops. In reality, I had not but fifty men killed or wounded by your furious cannonade. That is a proof that these cannons do much less execution, in comparison to the fear and respect which they ordinarily inspire. This occasion made me remark, Sir, that your English countrymen, notwithstanding their reputation for phlegmatic bravery, which has been attributed to them, are more foolhardy and less foreseeing than the French, who have always passed for being lively, fiery and impetuous, that scarcely have they patience to examine a position of the enemy before attacking him. Such is the idea you have in England of our nation; but if you judge of the two nations impartially, by the different actions which have occurred in Canada, I am persuaded that you will render us justice; and that you will confess that we have shown more *sang froid*, circumspection, and presence of mind than you. Your attack on the 31st of July, made without ever having taken an exact reconnoissance of that height, of which you had been deceived in the distance, is not the first attack of that kind which your countrymen have

made in Canada. In the meantime, nevertheless, it appears to me that, viewing the proximity of your camp to the Fall, you would have been able to make a perfect reconnoissance of that acclivity, whether with telescopes, or by landing a force across the ford of the river of Montmorency in the night at low water, to visit that height; or by landing a force between our two hindmost redoubts, to climb up there during the obscurity of the night. General Abercrombie, your predecessor in the command of the English army, made the same mistake in the year 1758, at Carillon, and his loss was still more considerable than yours. I left Montreal in the month of May, 1758, to proceed to Fort Carillon, which the English called Tinonderoga, with all my regular troops, the regiments of the Queen, the Sarre, the Royal Rousillon, Languedoc, Beaux, Guyenne, and Berry which was of two battalions, and the unattached French companies of the marine of Canada; the whole composing a corps of about four thousand men, the regiments not being complete, without having had any certain advice that the English army would come by the Lake of St. Sacrement to attack Carillon and penetrate thereby into Canada. I foresaw it, nevertheless, on account of the proximity of that fort to your establishments upon the Lake of St. Sacrement; and I never ceased to press M. Vaudreuil to send to me, with all possible despatch the Canadian Militia, which formed the principal strength of my army; but M. Vaudreuil not imagining that my conjectures were well founded, in place of sending them, gave them leave to remain at Montreal to work in fields and at other country labour. On the 7th of July, my conjectures were realized, being informed that the English army, of six thousand three hundred regular troops and thirteen thousand militia of the colonies, had landed at the fall, an advanced post a league from Carillon, where the Lake of St. Sacrement terminates, and where there were about twenty thousand men commanded by M. Abercrombie, a general of






# CARILLON or TINONDEROGA



- a. Fort Carillon.
- b. Intrenchments on the heights.
- c. Intrenchments of the Colonial troops.
- d. Two companies of Grenadiers.
- e. Attack of the English on three columns, 1, 2, and 3.
- f. A ravine.
- gg. Two hills, where the enemy had their Chasseurs and their best troops.
- h. A line of brushwood before the intrenchments.
- i. The regiment of Berry.
- lm. Two places of the hill of easy ascent.

*By M. The Chevalier de Johnstone.*






R I V E R

R I V E R O F S T. F R E D E R I C

SCALE OF 300 TOISES





reputation in your country, who had succeeded General Braddock, killed the year before at the Beautiful River: the arrival of the *debris* of a detachment of four hundred men which I had placed at the fall, of which there had been five hundred killed there, did but confirm me too surely of the truth of that news. One can hardly imagine a situation more embarrassing and more annoying than that in which I then found myself, above all, not having the Canadians, which formed the most essential part of my army, by their manner of fighting in the woods. The Fort of Carillon (*a*) is a square of about seventy toises of length on every side, regularly fortified with walls of masonry and terraces, ditches, with a court-way and glacis. M. Boursoulme, a very skilful officer, and of great merit, added to it in 1759 a half moon. For me to retire with my four thousand men was to give up the colony to M. Abercrombie, the Fort Carillon not being able to sustain for a long time a siege against an army so considerable. Besides, this fort was the key of Canada on that side of it, and M. Abercrombie having rendered himself master of it, would have found nothing that would have been able to prevent him from going straight to Montreal, which was not susceptible of defence. On the other hand, to oppose four thousand men against twenty thousand, the game was by no means equal; nevertheless there was nothing to decide the chance, and I determined either to save the country, or to die gloriously with arms in hands. During the night I made the whole force work to cut down trees to make an intrenchment (*b, b, b, b,*) which was very small; the engineers having stripped the trees of their branches, piled at length the one above the other, forming a kind of parapet, but not sufficiently high to place my soldiers under cover; and which the enemy could without difficulty have been able to overleap. A heap of tree-tops outside, with points of their branches well sharpened, would have made an intrenchment, which would have required less time to construct, and would have been more

impenetrable. At two paces outside the intrenchment, I caused place all around the height a line of branches (*h, h, h,*) points outside. Not having time to make an intrenchment in the bottom at the left of the height, which could have been done, about forty or fifty paces broad, between the foot of the height and the river at the Fall, I placed there two companies of grenadiers (*d*), and I caused the hollow at the right of the height to be occupied by the unattached marine troops, where the intrenchment (*c, c,*) was still worse than upon the height, supporting their right in front of the wood. The next day, the 8th of July, your army appeared at the border of the wood, about three hundred toises in front of our intrenchments upon the height, and bore down in an instant (*e*) upon three columns, without waiting to reconnoitre our position. Two columns attacked at once the height, with all the fury and impetuosity possible, but immediately they found themselves embarrassed by the branches, and being engaged inside, without being able to advance, they lost there an immense number of men. Some even having cleared them, were killed by our soldiers at the point of the bayonet, when jumping into our intrenchments. The chasseurs and militia of M. Abercrombie, who were under two engineers (*g, g,*) which commanded our intrenchments, pierced through part of them, and took another of them behind (*k*), where was the regiment of Berry, which was harrassed by their fire, one of these columns not being more than about forty toises from our intrenchments. The third column came forward, to attack the intrenchments in the hollow, which the French unattached companies of marines occupied, but the very brisk fire which poured on the head of these troops of the colony, and at the same time in flank of those who were on the height, turned the tables there presenting its head at the height (*k*) which it attacked vigorously. The troops of the colony, commanded by M. Raimond, then proceeded out of their intrenchments to approach nearer the column, and having poured a very brisk fire

upon the left flank of the column, at the side of the border of the wood, it appeared to us as if it wavered, but it continued always with obstinacy its attack against the height, and threw into disorder the regiment of Berry, which began to fall back and abandon the intrenchments. I was there quickly, and having encouraged the soldiers, order was re-established in a moment. I had placed my Grenadiers in rear of my intrenchments, in order as soon as we perceived that any portion of them should be forced, they might be able to run to their assistance on the spot, and throw themselves with head low upon the enemy, the bayonet at the musket's end. Having done all that the shortness of the time permitted me to do for a good defence, and preserved during the whole length of this attack the utmost coolness and presence of mind, to remedy the disorder which must naturally arise in an action so long and so determined, M. Abercrombie, after struggling desperately with the intention of forcing our intrenchments, was obliged in the end to make his retreat with the loss of from four to five thousand men, and to abandon his enterprise. In the space of a night it was impossible to throw up works so considerable, as to oppose an army so superior as mine. I did everything that it was possible to do to acquit myself with honour, and if I had been beaten, I would have had nothing to reproach myself with. To have done one's duty is a sweet satisfaction in all events, and most flattering and consoling, in fortune the most adverse. M. Abercrombie had made his attack with an inconceivable blindness and audacity, without having previously reconnoitred the place. This is what he would have had time to do from his landing, during two hours that he remained at the Fall, which is not a league from our intrenchments. Having neglected to examine our position at night, at least it would have been possible to do it, by remaining some time on the borders of the wood before debouching, but immediately on arriving, he proceeded forthwith in advance to make the attack. If he had advanced on

the 7th, at the moment of his landing, in place of passing the night at the Fall, I would have never dared to make head against him, on equal ground with so small a force; and he would have allowed me to take the course of retiring on the spot, leaving at Carillon as many troops as the fort could contain, in order to protract the siege of it longer. If the columns of the left (<sup>3</sup>) had followed the border of the wood to fall upon the right flank of the intrenchments of the colony to hold the middle of the space between the wood and the height, which might be three hundred toises in length, it would have found itself beyond the reach of the fire of the height, and would have overthrown in an instant the troops of the colony, who not being able to resist the shock of the columns, would have been all at once put to flight. Carrying themselves up, in fine, with rapidity to the side of the height, in a place where it diminished much and is of easy access, they would have taken our intrenchments behind. At the single view of this manœuvre, I would have been under the necessity of abandoning my intrenchments with precipitation, not to have allowed my retreat to have been cut off from the fort, that which would have destroyed me without resource. The enemy would have been able to penetrate equally at the place where were my two companies of grenadiers (*d*), and which I had not time to cut off and mount upon the height, where the ascent (*l*) is gentle, to take equally the reverse of the intrenchments on the height. But he always persisted with determination and obstinacy in his attack upon the most difficult places, without ever regarding his right or his left, to see if he had the means of penetrating otherwise than by the height. It must have been that he had a bandage about his eyes, not to perceive that, during many hours that his attack lasted."

*Wolfe*.—"It was there, Sir, a day most glorious for you, and worthy the ambition of the greatest of men. Our columns not being distant but about ten paces from your in-





THE BETTE WALKER 1824

OFFICE OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

# ORDER OF MARCH OF GENERAL BRADDOCK

AT BELLE RIVER, 1757.



EXPLICATION.

- a. Corporal with Light Horses.
- b. A serjeant with carpenters.
- c. An officer with Light Horse.
- d. A company of Grenadiers.
- e. A cart with implements.
- f. Two pieces of cannon.
- g. A company of Grenadiers.
- h. Regiment of Halkett.
- iii. Companies of Volunteers of New York and Chasseurs.

kkk. Regiment of Dunbar.

l. Colonel Dunbar.

m. The Provost-Marshal and women of the army.



n. A company of Grenadiers.

o. Two field pieces.

p. A company of Grenadiers.

q. A corporal and four Light Horse.

By M. The Chevalier de Johnstone.



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trenchments, all our army recognized you, and distinguished you perfectly well, engaged incessantly cheering up, encouraging, and exciting the ardour of your soldiers; running continually along your lines with the fierceness of a lion, at a few paces in rear of your intrenchments, and exposing yourself too much for a general of an army. It appeared very clearly the disorder of your right, and M. Abercrombie redoubled his efforts to take advantage of it; but you were always throughout never disconcerted, and remedying immediately the least derangement that one could perceive in your troops, before it was possible to communicate itself to the other corps, which happens commonly with the quickness of lightning. This affair made you acquire so great a reputation in England, for talents, capacity, and great genius, that I confess to you, Sir, that the idea of having to fight against a general of your merit, made me act with trembling during the campaign of 1759, and my movements were always undecided. I would not be inclined to condemn the conduct of my countrymen who were before me in the command of the armies in Canada. The war of woods, which the savages and Canadians carry on, is so different from that of Europe, that the most able General, with the best disciplined troops, will never fail to be cut in pieces by the scalping knife of savages in these vast woods, by conducting themselves according to the rules of the military art, the principles of which throughout Europe are sure, fixed, and clear. They cried out in England against M. Braddock, who was cut in pieces at Belle Rivière in 1755, with four thousand men, by six hundred and fifty savages and Canadians, more than against M. Abercrombie. The reason is clear. M. Abercrombie returned to England; and the living find out a thousand ways of justifying themselves. But M. Braddock was dead. The dead are always in the wrong, and find few advocates sufficiently disinterested to plead their cause. The order of march and disposition of M. Braddock appears at the first sight altogether singular. In

analyzing it, it is no other thing than the rule of march practised throughout all Europe in crossing woods. An army of three columns; artillery carriages and baggage forming the column in the centre; the half of the grenadiers at the head to sustain the pioneers, having been obliged to form a road, in proportion as it should advance in the wood, to be able to pass its artillery and carriages; and the rest of the grenadiers closed up its march. It was invested all at once on all sides by savages dispersed in the woods, and every savage behind a tree, who looked out for a man, in a manner that all their aims took effect; and at every discharge they vaulted from tree to tree. What could regular troops do in such a case? To press close their ranks and files in proportion as they were exposed, as did General Braddock. They fired continually without seeing a man; and they were all cut to pieces without seeing an enemy. I do not know any other way of defending one's self against savages than that which I did at the Ford of Montmorency, by causing my soldiers cut with the bayonet at the but end of their muskets, slashing on all sides, wherever they saw a fire proceeding, without preserving any order, and dispersing themselves as they did. I had not two thousand men with me, and there were against me nine hundred savages, who were repulsed all at once, and were immediately dispersed."

*Montcalm.*—"I believe, Sir, that your idea is just. The savages, by repassing the Ford, said that there was no other means of fighting against the English, since they had learned to fight like them. It is singular that you had remained two months in inaction with your army divided, when, being master of the river St. Lawrence, by your ships of war, which had passed in front of Quebec, you would have been able to send a detachment below the city to effect a landing all around where you could have pleased, without finding the least opposition. You limited yourself to make one single landing at the village of Chambeux, about thirteen leagues from Quebec,

with a detachment of two thousand men ; but you were no sooner on the land, than the sight of our cavalry, which consisted of only two hundred Canadians, to whom I had given horses, and which the Chevalier Rochebeaucourt had a little drilled to form ranks and march together, you re-embarked all at once with precipitation, and with all the disorder possible, not having remained scarcely two hours on the land. All this brilliant exploit terminated in burning a house at Chambeaux, wherein were the equipments of some regiments. If this detachment, on being landed, had occupied James Cartier—a place which retained the name of him by whom the river St. Lawrence had been discovered, and who passed the winter there amongst the savages, having lost his vessel about ten leagues from Quebec,—and had occupied it, you would have cut off our communication with Montreal, where we kept our provisions, and we would have been lost without resource. James Cartier is so fortified by nature, that an army of a hundred thousand men could not have forced that post against three hundred men, who chose to defend it. It is situated in the bottom of a ravine of immense depth, and lost to view. The sides of the mountain are steep, but glistening in such a manner that you can see even to the bottom of the ravine. It is not possible to take it on the side of the wood, on account of the impracticable lakes and quagmires which are there found ; and it is equally beyond assault on the side of the river by its sharp elevation. The only way of attacking it would be to make a landing at the Chambeaux, as you had done, which is not distant more than three leagues, and to take it in rear ; and we never could have dislodged you therefrom, seeing you were absolute masters of the river by your marine. It is a most unique position.”

*Wolfe.*—“That is well said, but we did not know the *locale* of these places then ; and we cannot send to reconnoitre as in Europe.”

*Montcalm.*—"Your landing on the 13th of September, the day of our fatal epoch, to come to an anchorage at the foot of a mountain immensely high and steep, appeared to me a rashness beyond imagination. A handful of men upon the crest of this mountain would have been sufficient to repulse you with sticks in hand, or by throwing down stones upon you. I was very much surprised that this idea had never occurred to your mind, when we had three posts, the one close to the other, to defend that part, each of a hundred men; the one commanded by M. Douglas, captain of the Regiment of Languedoc; another by M. Rimini, captain of the Regiment of Sarre; and the third by M. Vergor, captain of the troops of the Colony. These three hundred men would have been more than sufficient to have placed us under shelter from every assault from that side, viewing the difficulty of the ground, which you could have never surmounted, if you had there met with the slightest resistance."

*Wolfe.*—"I do not justify my project of landing by the success of it, but by my combinations, which turned out to be good, and which succeeded according to what I had foreseen. It is by analyzing a plan that one is able to demonstrate, if it is well or ill concerted. In giving you the detail, I am persuaded, Sir, you would not blame me for having undertaken an attack so ridiculous in appearances, but reasonable on examination, if you do it impartially. In all expeditions composed of naval and land forces, there never fails to be between the two corps altercations, jealousies, and quarrels. The admiral and the general not being subordinate the one to the other, each commanding in chief his corps independent of the other, it is almost a miracle if you see them united in the same plan of operations, and that they yield reciprocally for the good of the service. The service of the marine and that of the land service are two studies, the principles of which are altogether different—there being no resemblance between the manœuvre of a ship and that of a battalion of



infantry ; nevertheless the admiral wishes to mix himself up with questions of land forces, of which he knows nothing ; and the general wishes to give his advice about the manœuvre of ships, of which he is equally ignorant. It is that which occasions these discords which reign perpetually between the two forces when they are detached together with a separate authority. If every one wished to confine himself within the knowledge of the part he has made his study, and had nothing solely at heart but the good of the service of his king and country, three-fourths of the expeditions of land troops mixed with the marine, would succeed better than they ordinarily do. They annoyed me much, especially towards the end of the campaign. On the 10th of September they held a council of war on board the "Admiral," when it was decided on to depart for Europe, viewing the danger to which ships of war were exposed in the end of the season in these outrageous seas, and that they could not remain longer. In consequence, orders were given to some vessels to sail, which immediately weighed anchor to descend the river St. Lawrence, and they commenced at once their preparations for the approaching departure of the whole fleet. On the 12th, two deserters came to me from one of your three posts, who were of your French regiments, and sufficiently drilled. On examining them, I discovered that your three posts, of which you have been speaking, were negligently guarded ; and, moreover, that M. Bougainville, who was with a detachment at Cape Rouge, about three leagues from Quebec, behoved to bring down, during the following night, some ships laden with provisions. It occurred to me at once to avail myself of this discovery, and I proceeded immediately to the admiral to communicate to him the particulars, praying him, at the same time, with clasped hands, to be pleased to concur in allowing me again to make another attempt ; and I promised him, if they fired on us twenty musket shots from your posts, I should desist at the moment, and that I should not think of

anything farther than to embark to return for England. The council agreed, and I commenced my landing at eleven o'clock at night. When my boats approached your two posts commanded by M. Douglas and M. Rimini, to the "Who goes there?" of your sentinels, my soldiers replied in French "Ships with provisions," as I had ordered them, and they let them pass without stopping them, as it would have been right to do, in order to recognize them and receive the password. Not finding any sentinel at your third post, where M. Vergor commanded, I made my disembarkation upon the spot, and all my army was on the ground before you perceived it. I commenced my landing by making a sergeant put his foot on ground, with ten grenadiers, ordering him to move himself always right in front, so that he might not be discovered, and I caused him to be followed by a lieutenant with a detachment of grenadiers, who had also orders to advance always at quick time, but to stop in an instant when he found the enemy. Not intending to fire, I made all my corps of grenadiers who followed the sergeant and lieutenant to debouch at once, and also, successively, the rest of my army, conceiving then good hopes of my enterprise by the silence of your posts. As soon as the head of my column arrived at the foot of the mountain, the soldiers climbed it, not without difficulty; and they served as guides to the others who were behind them. In short, they all passed to a marvel, and there was only one shot of a gun fired, which wounded M. Vergor in the heel, and they made him prisoner immediately; but we did not see a single soldier of his detachment. If your posts had been alert and upon their guard, all that I would have risked by their discharge would have been the loss of the sergeant and the lieutenant, with some forty grenadiers, and I would have stopped my career in the moment; for to attempt an attack on a strong force at a place so impracticable would have been a folly and extravagance unpardonable; but finding no opposition I continued to disembark my troops

with diligence, and as soon as I had some hundreds of men landed I feared nothing more, having known by your deserters that you had no troops upon the Heights of Abraham. You see then, Sir, that I risked nothing. It is my principle to seek out difficult places, which are generally ill guarded and neglected; and looking out where it might be possible to pass not more than one man abreast, it is there that a landing is sure to be made; for where one man is able to pass, a hundred thousand may do it, if they meet with no resistance. In forming them in proportion as they cleared the defile, the enemy being late in perceiving them, they would have immediately a sufficient force landed to make head, which at every moment increased; and the soldiers in those kinds of enterprises do not amuse themselves by the road, and they pass on with speed. Besides, in every surprise, the enemy is struck with terror, dismayed and disconcerted; and it requires more or less time for reflection to come to his aid: stupified by a circumstance which he had not foreseen, he is about half beaten in advance, before coming to the fight. It is true that if the enemy is beforehand aware of your design, you run the risk of his allowing part of your force to pass to entrap them in the end. But in these kind of enterprises, you proceed by groping your way in proportion as you advance. The landing at Louisbourg was executed in the same manner, and was very successful. We did not despise a small creek, of difficult approach, in which we disembarked, because it was not possible but for one boat to enter in front, all their forces being distributed in the great anchorages; and when they perceived our manœuvre, we had already landed from three to four hundred men, in battle array, who covered the landing. Scarcely ever do surprises, well planned and well executed, fail to be successful. The enemy do not meet you in a place difficult of access. Ordinarily, they do not even seem to give them the least attention; and it is when the enemy

does not wait for me that I always wish to make my principal attack.”\*

*Montcalm.*—“ Confess at least, Sir, that men are unjust. They reproach me for having been the cause of your success. They accuse me of having sacrificed the interests of my king and country, for which I would have shed all my blood, drop after drop, with pleasure, and that through pique and jealousy; and those who treated me a little more humanely, made me pass for a giddy goose and ignoramus. All these injurious stories, all these atrocious calumnies which were spread abroad, had their source from a class of men, who for their interest, and by their immoderate desire of riches, would have betrayed their God, as they have betrayed their king and country. These vile mercenary souls knew quite well that I detested them, as I nourished continually those in whom I found probity, integrity, and greatness of soul. My death has been their prosperity. If I had survived that fatal day to return to Europe, I would not have had any difficulty in justifying myself, and one only look would have made them tremble and shrink into nothingness. Truth, supported by innocence, overcomes and dissipates, sooner or later, the obscurity of the mist which covers it. They were not ignorant that I was acquainted with all their infamies and jobberies, and my death was not able even to glut their vengeance. Coming into Canada to enrich themselves, they left in Europe their honour and probity on embarking, and easily forgot to be patriotic and to be just. I will give you, Sir, a relation of our manœuvres on the action of the 13th of September, adhering scrupulously to the pure and simple truth, which has always been the rule of my conduct; and I will

\* Ferdinand, king of Arragon, made two armies take the field against the Moors, under the conduct of Count Aguilar, and gave them orders to enter at the same time the mountains of Grenada by the most difficult passes, and consequently the least guarded, and he gained a victory the most complete over the Moors.—*Life of Ximenes.*

demonstrate to you at the same time how you were indebted to fortune for your success, and that there happened a concentration of a thousand circumstances, which were all against you, to ensure your success, upon a false rumour at the beginning of August, that a body of English troops intended to penetrate into Canada by the highland districts. M. Levis was sent by M. Vaudrueil to command at Montreal. I felt all the regret possible at the departure of M. Levis, having always had a very great opinion of his intelligence and capacity, to which he had acquired a just title. Having proceeded to his house two hours before his departure, I beseeched him to leave with me his aide-de-camp, M. Johnstone, as an officer who would be useful to me by the knowledge which he had of our posts at the Fall of Montmorency, and the plans of defence of M. Levis in that quarter. He consented to it, and M. Johnstone remained with me, performing the functions of my aide-de-camp. In the night of the 10th or 11th of September, your boats had got the start of us, by appearing opposite the ravine of Beauport. I remained in the house of M. Vaudrueil till one o'clock in the morning that I left his house with M. Montrueil, major-general of the army, and with M. Johnstone. On again seeing M. Montrueil, after having given him my orders, I recounted to M. Johnstone all the arrangements I had taken with M. Vaudrueil in case you should have effected your landing at break of day. He answered me that the enemy having actually concentrated their forces to that at the point Levis, and their army having ascended below Quebec, coasting along the other bank of the river on the side towards the south, they were not able to know at the moment, the place where you would attempt your landing, whether it would be above the city, or below on the side of Canardiere, being menaced equally by both. He added that he believed a body of troops would be advantageously placed on the Heights of Abraham, as in a central point, to be able to throw itself with celerity, wherever the

enemy should attempt his landing. I approved greatly of these ideas. I recalled M. Montrucil, who was not as yet far from us, and I ordered him immediately to cause mount at once the regiment of Guyenne, on the Heights of Abraham, there to pass the night. This regiment being encamped before the horn-work, found itself the readier for the height. The next day, the 11th of September, I wrote to M. Montrucil, ordering him to cause the regiment of Guyenne to encamp upon the Heights of Abraham, to remain there in a fixed post till a new order, and I always believed, that that regiment was there, in consequence of my orders to M. Montrucil; for what reason he had landed and occupied his old camp in front of the horn-work, I am ignorant; but it is certain that if that regiment had remained there conformably to my orders, you would have been cut up in an instant, the height where you had made your landing being ten times more steep and elevated than that where you made your attack on the 31st of July. Moreover, you would have never attempted your landing, and you would have embarked your army to return to Europe. Thus Canada would have been saved and delivered for ever from your enterprises, in the view of the incredible expense your expedition cost England, which they suppose a million a day, French money; and then the campaign would have been ended.

“As soon as you had united your whole army in one single camp at the point Levis, after having remained nearly two months separated in a position, in which it was not possible to establish communication, between the one end and the other, your army ascended the river to within seven or eight leagues below Quebec. I then sent M. Bougainville with a detachment of five hundred, the *elite* of my army, composed of all the grenadiers, the companies of volunteers drafted from different regiments, my best Canadians and savages; and I gave him, at the same time, some pieces of cannon. I had ordered M. Bongainville to follow with precision all your

movements, and never to lose sight of you; to ascend the river when you ascended it, and descend it in the same manner. In short, to be a corps of observation, always ready to be at hand to oppose your landing, in case you attempted to cross the river, to fall upon you with the swiftness of an eagle, the moment that you should attempt to set your foot on ground. On the 12th of September, M. Bougainville sent to inform me that your army was landed quite opposite to Quebec. Why he had not followed his instructions, instead of remaining with his detachment at Cape Rouge, which is about three miles from Quebec? Why were you not followed to the Heights of Abraham? Why did he not send back my grenadiers and volunteers, who were the soul of my corps, as I have well proved by their absence from the battle the next day? Why, after having informed me also that the posts of Douglas and Rimini, where he ought to have landed his boats that night laden with provisions, did he not send, at the instant, a counter order to let them know his change of plan, and that his boats would not sail till the following night? I knew nothing of all this. I learnt between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, by deserters from these posts, that you were on ground upon the Heights of Abraham, and he put himself in march, but unfortunately by taking the road along the coast which conducted straight to your army, in place of the other road which led to my camp. He would have even been able to quit the Heights of Abraham, after having come in sight of your army, convinced clearly that it shut up the road, and to have joined me again, some time before the battle, which did not take place till about one o'clock in the morning, in proceeding by the side of the general hospital, and from thence to the bridge at the horn-work, traversing the river St. Charles. It was still more in effecting my misfortune that he found on this road a house full of from three to four hundred men of your troops. He attempted to take there M. Noir,

captain of the regiment of Sarre, in that house with his company of volunteers, having much more intrepidity and bravery than prudence and knowledge of the strength of a fort secured by barricades and well fortified. He was immediately repulsed with the loss of more than the half of his company; and he received at the same time two wounds, one ball through the body, and the other in the hand. M. Bougainville had stood firm and stopped before that fort to wait the arrival of his cannon in order to force it. The cannons arrived, but they found they had forgot the balls; thus they lost the most precious moments; and in the end he retraced his steps to Cape Rouge with his detachment. The night of the 12th and 13th of September, M. Poularies, commandant of a battalion of the royal regiment of Roussillon, who was encamped behind my house at Beauport, entered my house, at midnight to inform me that he saw boats opposite my camp. I ordered the whole force immediately to proceed to the border of the intrenchments, and I sent without delay M. Marcel to the house of M. Vaudreuil, an officer in the train of the regiment of the queen, who served me as aide-de-camp, ordering him to pass the night there; and if he learned there anything new, to despatch one of my ordnance troopers, which I gave him to remain with him, in order to acquaint me with it forthwith. I promenaded in front of my house with M. Poularies and M. Johnstone. At one o'clock in the morning I sent back M. Poularies to his regiment, and I passed the rest of that night promenading with Johnstone between my house and the ravine. I was throughout the whole night in a state of extreme dejection and inconceivable agitation of mind. I believed, that my anxieties arose from the boats of provisions which M. Bougainville ought to have sent, and I repeated often to Johnstone that I trembled lest they should be captured, the loss of which would ruin us without resource, not having two day's provisions of subsistence for the army. It appears to me that my extraordinary

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sufferings that night were a presage of the fatal lot that befell me some hours after. At break of day they fired some cannon shots from our battery of Samos opposite Sillery, and I never more doubted but that our boats had not been taken. Alas! I never could have imagined that our provisions were in safety at Cape Rouge with M. Bougainville, and that you were landed on the Heights of Abraham since midnight, without my having had advice of a circumstance so important, and which was known throughout all the right of our army. Broad daylight beginning to appear without receiving any news, and M. Marcel not having sent back my ordnance trooper, I had my mind more tranquil by the reflection that if anything had happened they would, without doubt, have given me advice; and I sent M. Johnstone to cause the whole force re-enter their tents, the whole having passed the night bivouacking in the intrenchments. Having retired myself to my house, and after having drunk some cups of tea with M. Johnstone, I said to him 'to saddle the horses, and that we would make a tour to the house of M. Vaudreuil in order to learn why the battery at Samos had fired.' No person having come from the right since midnight that I had sent M. Marcel, we departed between six and seven o'clock in the morning. Having arrived in front of M. Vaudreuil's house, great God, what a surprise! For the first news of what had occurred during the night was that we saw your army on the Heights of Abraham, who were keeping up a discharge of musketry with the Canadians scattered among the brushwood. At the same time I met M. Vaudreuil on horseback, who was just coming from his house. I spoke to him on the instant, and turning towards M. Johnstone, I said to him, 'the affair is serious: run to Beauport at the gallop, ordering M. Poularies on my part to remain at the ravine of Beauport with two hundred men, and that he should cause the whole left advance in order to take possession of the height in front of Quebec with all possible despatch.' M. Johnstone having

communicated my orders to M. Poularies, left him an instant to give some instructions to the people of my house, which was close by; and being returned from the ravine in the road to rejoin me on the height, he there found M. Poularies with M. Senezergue, lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of Sarre, and M. Lotbiniere, aide-de-camp to M. Vaudreuil, who stopped him to reiterate my orders to him. M. Johnstone having done this, added that he strongly advised M. Poularies not to confine himself to this order, but to repair himself before Quebec with the whole left, not leaving one behind; since the English having landed on the Heights of Abraham, it was evident that they would never seek to make a second landing at Beauport to divide their forces; and that there would be certainly a general and decisive action on the Heights immediately. M. Poularies then showed to M. Johnstone a signed order by M. Montreuil, which M. Lotbiniere had come to bring him, which said 'that no person of the left should budge from the camp.' M. Johnstone declared to them upon his honour, and taking God to witness that what he had said to them was word for word my orders and my intentions, and he advised strongly M. Poularies not to have the least regard to the order signed by M. Montreuil, the affair being very serious and of the last consequence, since it would occasion the absence of about two thousand men from the battle, which might take place in an instant, and was inevitable from the position which they had taken up on the Heights. M. Senezergue, a very worthy man, who was killed an hour afterwards, said to Johnstone that he should take upon him to cause them march; but he replied, that not being but the simple bearer of my orders, he could take nothing upon him: that if he was a brigadier of the army, as he was, and second after me in commanding the army by the absence of M. Levis, he would not hesitate an instant in causing the march: that all that he could do was to run with the utmost speed to give me an account of this

+ perhaps Johnstone's mistake: Royal Council  
 ← Charlevoix p65+

counter-order. Johnstone then took his leave at once, leaving them together in a state of indecision. *1 July 29th 83*

"I do not know, among a thousand other things of which I am ignorant, what it was that made us take up a position between your army and Quebec, which was of all those which it was possible for us to choose the very worst, because there were no provisions in the city, and the best of our troops were absent with M. Bougainville at Cape Rouge. It was not I that did this, for all the picquets of the right had already marched to the heights before my arrival at the house of M. Vaudreuil, and even before I knew that you had landed, and I found the different corps without arms ready to follow them when I arrived at their encampments. Our true manœuvre ought to have been to have proceeded by the village of Lorette, to have straightway gained the heights of the village of St. Foix, about three leagues from Quebec and a league from Cape Rouge, in order to facilitate our junction with the detachment of Bougainville, and to have come upon you at St. Foix the next day before you would have been able to entrench yourselves, hemming you in against the city, where you would have been engaged between two fires, by a sally from the garrison at the same time with an attack. I was not sooner upon these heights than I perceived well our unfortunate position, cooped up as we were against the city, and having no provisions there inside to subsist our army twenty-four hours. But the evil was without remedy, and being in battle array at a gun-shot from your line, it was morally impossible that you would have been able to dislodge us from thence. To descend the heights to return to the bridge of St. Charles at the horn-work, we would have laid open our left flank to the enemy, and been exposed in an instant to be entirely cut in pieces with disgrace, not having the power of defending ourselves; to have entered into the city you would have been able in a moment to shut us up without provisions by lengthening your left by the suburbs at the side of the

*Govt  
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palace, even to the bank of the river St. Charles. I did not think more than to overwhelm you with a cannonade, and the ground upon which my army found itself in battle array was favourable for that, having several small eminences in the the extent of our line which commanded you. I imagined that on your finding yourself greatly incommoded by my artillery, perhaps you would take the course of retiring in the night. Then I sent at once to the town to demand of M. Ramsay, the king's lieutenant at Quebec, to bring me with all the diligence possible the twenty-four field pieces which were upon the palace battery. Precisely at the instant that M. Johnstone rejoined me upon the Heights of Abraham, and that he had communicated to me the counter order that had been sent from M. Poularies, the sergeant whom I had sent to M. Ramsay for the fourth time, that I had ordered him to send me the field pieces, came to tell me on his part 'that he had sent me three pieces of cannon, and that he could not give me more, having the town to defend.' What could have been the idea of M. Ramsay? I know nothing of it. In the first place, the town was defended by our army, which covered it, being in battle array at the distance of a gun-shot from the gates, and its safety depended upon the issue of a combat.

"Secondly, There were in the town more than two hundred pieces of cannon for its defence, of which the greater part were twenty-four and thirty-six pounders.

"Thirdly, Of the field pieces of two pounders, of which the battery of the palace was composed, they could never be regarded as of any utility in defence of a place.

"I assembled at once a council of war, composed of all the chiefs of corps. Some pretended that you were occupied in entrenching yourselves; others that you would attempt to descend from the height to proceed to the bridge over the river St. Charles, in order to cut off our retreat, and even communication with the left of our army, which remained at

*probably. alleged*

the ravine of Beauport, in consequence of the counter order from M. Poularies; in fact, a movement which your army then made in carrying you to the side of the house of Borgios, that which you had occupied at first from which the Canadians chased you, in there keeping up a fire, seemed to favour this opinion, that movement having been made at the moment of holding the council. Others said that the more they delayed the more they would have of the enemy to combat, in the belief that your whole army was not yet landed, and brought on the heights; in short, there was not a single officer of the council of war who was not of opinion that we should attack you the moment. What to do in this distressing and desolate situation, from which I could see no resource! I believe that a Marshal Turenne would have found himself very much embarrassed to be able to extricate himself from a situation so unfortunate as that in which they had placed me. Having heard all their advices, I replied, 'It appears to me, gentlemen, that you are all unanimously of opinion to give battle and charge the enemy forthwith, and that it does not signify at present, but to know in what manner we ought to attack.' M. Montreuil said, 'that we should charge in columns.' I answered him, 'that that was not possible, and that it was necessary to charge in front of banner.' Thus some columns would be able to form themselves with undisciplined men, and at a distance of a gun-shot from the enemy. We would have been cut off before being formed into columns. Besides, we had not our grenadiers, who were at Cape Rouge with M. Bougainville, to guard the head of our columns. I yielded to their advice. I sent back at once every one to his post, and I caused make the charge. Our attack was not forcible. We were repulsed in an instant. And this could not have been otherwise, from the absence of our volunteers with M. Bougainville, and our best Canadians, the Montreal regiment, with M. Poularies, at the ravine of Beauport. This brave militia, the Canadians, to the num-

\* Does he not mean grenadiers? Volunteers  
doesn't fit well.

ber of from twelve to fifteen hundred, saw us, with grief, cut to pieces on the heights, suffering violently at being spectators of our misfortunes, without their being permitted to cross the river of St. Charles to come to our assistance, having been all stopped at the horn-work. We did not lose many men. About two hundred resolute and determined Canadians rallied themselves at the foot of the height, in front of Boulangerie, and remounted the ascent with inconceivable bravery and intrepidity. They threw themselves upon your left with incredible fury, like desperate men, and kept your army in check during some minutes, which gave time to our army in rear to save themselves with less loss, by stopping the pursuit of your victorious army to turn against them. These brave Canadians disputed foot to foot of ground, and in retreating they continued always firm, mid-way up the ascent, firing above upon your troops. When they were entirely repulsed, obliged in the end to yield to numbers, and your troops pursuing them were descending after them into the plain before Boulangerie, if you had advanced three or four hundred paces farther to the banks of the river St. Charles, you would have shut up the debris of our army in the town of Quebec, without provisions, and there must have then been next day a general capitulation of the colony; but as to that, it was wise and prudent for you in your position to make a bridge of boats to your enemy in rout, and not to run the risk of letting the victory escape out of your hands. You see, Sir, by the true and sincere detail which I have given you, how all the events combined in your favour to enable you to succeed in your enterprise, of the great number of which one alone would have sufficed to make your expedition in Canada successful. It seemed that Heaven had ordained the loss of this colony to France. Let us conclude presently that I have little merited the blame and injustice which they have heaped upon me in public, than you the excessive honours which they have lavished on you in your

country, and that the ablest general in my situation would not have been able to conduct himself otherwise than I have done. Besides, being subordinate to M. Vaudreuil, I could not act and follow my ideas so freely as if I had commanded in chief. It is only the ignorant who judge by events."

*Wolfe*.—"I confess, Sir, that I have been guilty of errors. I was then young and rash, but age and experience would have corrected me. Marshal Turenne had in view Mariendhal, which he never forgot. The human mind is limited. I shall finish our discussion by what was said by the Duke of Buckingham, one of the greatest geniuses of England, whose ashes repose beside mine, in an epitaph which he composed himself for his tomb—'*Humanum est errore et nescire*' ('To err is human and not to know.')

The death of Wolfe was like that of Epaminondas—when mortally wounded he asked if the British were victorious, and being told they were, he said "I die content," and expired without a groan.—ED.

## END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1759.

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MONTCALM, in endeavouring to rally our troops in their rout, received the shot of a gun, which pierced through his abdomen. He was carried to Quebec, and lodged in the house of M. Arnoux, surgeon to the king. The wound having been examined by M. Arnoux, the younger, the elder brother being absent with M. Bourlamarque at Carillon, was pronounced mortal. This worthy and great man learned his melancholy news with a tranquillity and serenity of soul and with a heroism worthy of the ancient Romans. He begged M. Arnoux, with *sang froid*, and an air of indifference to the choice of living or dying, to tell him frankly till what hour he would be able to preserve his existence. The surgeon answered him that he could not be able to pass three o'clock in the morning; and he ended his days a little before the hour that M. Arnoux had foretold him, pronouncing for his last words, "I die content, since I leave the affairs of the king, my dear master, in good hands: I have always highly valued the talents and capacity of M. Levis." I shall not undertake to pronounce the eulogy of this great, truly patriotic man, whose reputation, if he had chanced to be born in England, would have been transmitted to posterity: celebrated and illustrious by his virtues, by his great genius, by every sort of eminent qualities which deserved the best chaplet; but an unfortunate

*guilaudé, autem debeat*



victim to the insatiable avarice of some, and a prey to the ambition of others.\*

As soon as I learned his misfortune, I charged Joseph, his valet-de-chambre, who went the instant to rejoin his master at Quebec, to say to him that if I could be useful to him, that I would come immediately to be with him; but Joseph returned without delay, to find me at the horn-work, with a reply on his part "that it would be useless to come thither, not having but a few hours to live, advising me to remain with M. Poularies to wait the arrival of M. Levis."

Our army in rout, totally dispersed, threw itself on the side of Quebec, the great part of which, without entering into that town, descended the Heights of Abraham opposite the palace in the suburbs, and followed the banks of the river St. Charles to proceed to the horn-work, where there was a bridge of boats across that river. From the time I saw our overthrow without remedy, I formed the resolution of descending from the heights to the side of the windmill to throw myself into the horn-work, fearing the risk of being shut up in the town by the enemy going there, which he would have been able to do by easy movements from the position of the English army, by cutting off the communication of the city with the horn-work. Carried along at first towards Quebec in the middle of the fugitives, in descending into a marshy puddle, I there found one of our cannons embedded, with some gunners who were making ineffectual exertions to drag it out. I stopped for a little with them to encourage them;

\* The ashes of this man, mixed with those of savages, repose coldly on the other side of the seas. They do not require a mausoleum or altars. Wolfe had statues in England for the blunders which he had continually committed during the course of this campaign. How do deaths veil the remains of the greatest men to titles still more vain! O, injustice of men! Mausoleums decorate our temples and repeat incessantly false eulogiums; and history, which ought to be the asylum of truth, and to prove that statues and panegyrics are almost always monuments of prejudice or adulation, denies this unjust reputation.

but the gunners having in the end abandoned it, on re-ascending the eminence to go to the windmill, I found myself presently in the midst of a crescent which the English army had formed in advancing. I persisted in going to the mill, and in spite of the thousand musket shots from all parts that were aimed at me, I was sufficiently fortunate to escape that terrible fusillade, without any other hurt than to have my clothes shattered and pierced through by four different balls, another ball lodged in the front stuffing of my saddle, and four balls in my horse's body, which carried me, nevertheless, to the horn-work, in spite of his wounds. On arriving there I found an incredible confusion and disorder; a general panic and consternation; M. Vaudreuil listening to every one, and always to the advice of him who spoke to him last; not an order given with reflection or coolness; in short, not knowing in fact, neither what they said nor what they wished to do. When the enemy had defeated the Canadians, who had re-ascended the heights, that necessarily happened, as two hundred men could not long keep in check an army of ten thousand men; the English descending in the plain close to the baking establishment in pursuit of these Canadians, it was then that the disorder in the horn-work became to an inconceivable degree, and that every one's head was turned. M. Montgay and M. Motte, two captains in the Berne regiment, cried out with vehemence to M. Vaudreuil, "that the horn-work would be carried in an instant, sword in hand; that we would all be passed at the point of the sword; and that there was only a general capitulation for the colony at once that would be able to save us." M. Vaudreuil answered them, "that as to a capitulation there must be articles, and time and consideration for making them." M. Montreuil said to them, "that they could not sweep away these works as briskly as the former." It must be observed that we had the river St. Charles between us and the enemy, of about forty toises broad, which served as a ditch to the horn-work;

and the part of that work which skirted the river was made very solidly with thick piles of wood, but very high and very difficult to be taken by assault. Others cried with a loud voice, that it was necessary to <sup>cut</sup> ~~pass~~ down the bridge, while as yet a fourth part of our army had not passed, as one might be able to see from the banks of St. Charles; the whole force, which came in flocks, covered the ground from the town to the bridge, and the royal regiment of Roussillon, which we could discover on the other side of the river ready to cross it. Having formerly met in with defeats, my head was not turned; and although I had already learned the dismal fate of the unfortunate M. Montcalm, which penetrated me with grief to the bottom of my soul, I presumed as yet upon a kind of authority and respect, which I had acquired in the army, and which were lent me from the goodness and confidence which he and M. Levis had always testified to me publicly. I called on M. Hugen, an officer of the colony, who had commanded at the horn-work for some time with a detachment, and begged him to accompany me. We ran to the bridge, and without demanding who it was that had given orders to break it down, we drove away from it the soldiers, who had already hatchets lifted up to accomplish this fine manœuvre. M. Vaudreuil having entered into a house which he had within the walls of the horn-work, immediately after his reply on the subject of the general capitulation, he there held a council with M. Bigot, the commissary, and with some inconsiderable officers. Doubting greatly of what they treated, the bridge being safe, I entered also; but I had only time to see M. Bigot seated, with a table before him, and a pen in his hand, when M. Vaudreuil said to me at once to leave the house, adding that I had no business there. The Governor-general had reason along with him, for the infamy of wishing to surrender to the English, so lightly, a colony which had cost France such immense sums of money, as well as blood, to preserve it, and which could be so advantageous

to that nation—ought naturally to revolt and check a man who had a soul and who thought with honour and sensibility. On leaving the house I found M. Dalquier, commandant of the battalion of Berne, and having laid open to him what had been transacting, I caused him to enter there to take his place at the council. He was one of those true military men, capable of shedding all his blood, drop and drop, for his king, brave as a hero, a well-bred man, and full of honour. I then left the horn-work to join M. Poularies at the ravine of Beauport; but I met him not far from that work, and having informed him of all that had taken place there, he replied to me that he would rather be hacked in a thousand pieces than submit to a general capitulation—set spurs to his horse, and parted like a flash of lightning, flying at full speed. As this was a determined officer, of a phlegmatic bravery, I was reassured that he and M. Dalquier would overturn every project which they could have for a general capitulation of the colony. M. Poularies, on quitting me, offered me his horse, which I accepted; and I continued my road to proceed to Beauport, with a very broken heart, greatly fatigued, low-spirited, and overwhelmed with chagrin with the horrid adventure of the morning, a few hours having produced a terrible revolution in my situation by the death of M. Montcalm, which even time would not be able to repair, losing in him a true and sincere friend, who loved me tenderly, and with whom in appearance I should have passed the rest of my days, as he often said to me, if cruel and perfidious Fortune had not snatched him from me.

It was decided at the council of war, in the horn work, that we should retreat to James Cartier, an advantageous position, about ten leagues from Quebec, and there wait the arrival of M. Levis, to whom we despatched a courier to inform him of our disaster. Our departure, in the meantime, was fixed to be at night-fall; and all the corps were ordered to betake themselves to their different camps till a new order.

*The* A resolution taken for the purpose of retreat, <sup>was</sup> ought to be a secret, without being communicated to any person, not even to the officers. I passed the whole day with M. Poularies, in continual expectation till he should receive his orders on the subject of the arrangements, and necessary disposition to conduct a retreat without disorder and confusion; but at eight o'clock at night, the night closing in, and not having had any news, M. Poularies, not knowing further to what hand to turn him, sent his sub-aide, Major M. Castaigne, to the house of M. Vaudreuil to receive his orders in that respect. M. Castaigne returned with speed to apprise M. Poularies that M. Vaudreuil and the whole right of our army were already gone; that there had not been any order given on the subject, but that the army had left the horn-work. One may judge of our surprise! M. Poularies sent at once to the post which was nearest to his regiment at Beauport, with orders to give notice thereof from post to post, till the Fall of Montmorency; and I departed instantly with him and his regiment, every one having for guide the regiment which had left before him, but without knowing otherwise the route which they ought to take, a march exactly *a la sauvage*, (like savages.) This was not a retreat, but a flight the most abominable; a rout even a thousand times worse than that of the morning on the Heights of Abraham, and with so much confusion and disorder that, if the English had known it, it would not have required more of them than three hundred men to have cut in pieces our whole army. Except the Royal Regiment of Roussillon, which M. Poularies kept in and preserved in order, I did not see thirty men of any one regiment together. All the corps mixed and dispersed, and every one running as fast as his legs could carry him, as if the enemy were pursuing them close at their heels.

As I had a perfect knowledge of the local position of the left of our camp, during several weeks that I had remained there with M. Levis and M. Montcalm, I believed it possible

to point out to M. Poularies the arrangement which they ought to make for our retreat, and the road which every regiment should take to arrive at Lorrette. But I deceived myself grievously ; and I could have never imagined such a disposition of march for regular troops, equally foolishly concerted as ill executed, and which lengthened considerably the road which the troops of the centre had to make, and of the left of our camp to reach Lorrette. There is a great road which goes in a direct line direct from the Fall of Montmorency to the village of Lorrette, and which makes the side of a triangle formed by another great road from the Fall to Quebec, and by a road which ascends from the horn-work straight to Lorrette. In the extent of the road to Quebec from the horn-work to the Montmorency Fall, there are about seven or eight different cross-roads to get into the great road from the Fall to Lorrette ; thus it was natural to believe that every regiment would have been ordered to take the cross road which would be the nearest to the place where they were encamped. This would have shortened the road a league to the troops who were encamped at the Fall, who might arrive at the horn-work to seek the road from thence to Lorrette. Above all, the whole corps would have been able in a short time to reunite in the road to Lorrette ; and that would have prevented them from coming near the enemy, as they did ; but they fled with such precipitation that they were under the necessity of abandoning everything which was in our camp, tents, cannons, munitions of war, the royal magazines, the baggage, in a word, any thing that they were not able to carry along with them, which they would have been able easily to avoid, having had time from mid-day, when the retreat was decided on, till night, to clear everything away ; but they never thought of putting the horses and carriages into requisition. The enemy was ignorant of our retreat for forty-eight hours ; and always seeing our tents standing, believed us still in our camp, without ever daring to send to

clear up the matter. M. Bellecour, a cavalry officer of Rochebeaucourt's, returned to our camp two days after our retreat, where he found everything in the same state in which we had left them; having entered the horn-work with his detachment, he pointed some of our cannon at the enemy's camp upon the Heights, and fired off some shots which alarmed them greatly. We marched all the night, and at the break of day, M. Bougainville rejoined us with his detachment. We arrived at night at the point of Trembles, where we passed the night; and next day at James Cartier.

In short, M. Levis having made great speed, arrived at James Cartier to take the command of the army, very opportunely to revive the exhausted spirits, and re-animate the courage of the soldiers, who are brave or dastardly, according to the manner in which they are commanded, and the disposition of their commanders. This general, brave, intrepid, and of distinguished merit, determined to give battle for the purpose of trying to save Quebec, the capture of which would naturally involve the loss of Canada; and for that purpose, our army returned to Cape Rouge the next day, after his arrival, every one appearing very much disposed and ardent to repair the misfortune of the 13th.

M. Vaudreuil, upon our retreat, had written without reflection to M. Ramsay, king's lieutenant and commandant of the city of Quebec, that he should make a capitulation of that city within forty-eight hours after our departure from Beauport, upon the best conditions that he could obtain from the enemy. As soon as we arrived at Cape Rouge, M. Levis and M. Vaudreuil wrote to M. Ramsay, not to have any regard to the letter that M. Vaudreuil had written to him the day of our retreat; that the French army would be the next day in the morning upon the Heights of Abraham, in sight of the city, and that it was the issue of a battle that ought to decide the surrender of Quebec. M. Rochebeaucourt was charged to transmit these letters to M. Ramsay, and this

officer acquitted himself of that commission with all the promptitude and prudence possible. He crossed the river of St. Charles, and entered the city without having met with any one post of the enemy in his way. It was not even invested by the enemy on the side of the suburbs of the palace. Having delivered his despatches, M. Ramsay answered him that he had already entered into a capitulation with the English, and that it was at present too far advanced for him to be able to retract, as there were no provisions in the city, and above all, that he knew for what he held it. M. Rochebeaucourt said to him that there were certainly provisions in the private cellars, and that if he would force open the doors, he would find them there. But M. Ramsay always repeated to him, that he had entered into a capitulation, and that he knew how to hold it. This officer having returned to Cape Rouge with the answer of M. Ramsay, was sent back at once with a peremptory order in writing to M. Ramsay, to suspend every capitulation with the enemy till a new order, and he was escorted by fifty of his horsemen, each horseman carrying behind him a sack of biscuits. The Chevalier Rochebeaucourt entered the city with his horsemen as before, but the reply of M. Ramsay was always the same, that the capitulation was too far advanced for him to be able to suspend it, and that he knew for what to hold it. It was thus that M. Ramsay, who did not wish to send to M. Montcalm the twenty-five pieces of cannon from the palace battery, having his place to defend, surrendered his place without trenches being opened, without batteries being established by the enemy, and without there being a cannon-shot fired either upon the one side or the other: an inconsistency and extraordinary folly, of which one can comprehend nothing.

Seeing the determination of M. Ramsay to surrender the city of Quebec, our army returned to James Cartier, M. Levis not wishing then to expose them to the hazard of a battle, where there was little to gain and much to lose, the



enemy being in possession of the city. Otherwise by making a sortie from the city by our garrison during the attack of our army, the enemy would have found themselves between two fires, and would have felt themselves much embarrassed in returning it; and I do not doubt but the colony would have yet been able to have been saved, if it had not been for this irregular conduct of M. Ramsay. We remained at James Cartier till towards the end of October, that M. Levis sent the whole force into their winter quarters, with the exception of two thousand men, which he left there under the orders of M. Dumas, major of the colonial troops, to pass the winter; this detachment under M. Dumas being intended to continually harass the enemy, and attack the detachments which might sally out of Quebec, to seek for forage in the woods, and other things of which they might stand in need from the country. In the meantime the winter passed on without hostilities; on the contrary, there was established an intercourse between the English at Quebec and the French at James Cartier, as if it had been a time of peace, which to appearance the two commanders turned to account.

The English having intercepted by their fleet all our merchant vessels, coming out of France, the merchandizes of Europe were at an incredible price at Montreal, where they were in want of everything, while at Quebec everything was in abundance and at a low price, owing to the prizes which the English had made of the French shipping. The house merchant sold at Montreal four barrels of wine at a thousand livres the barrel, which was sold in retail at forty-eight per pint; the bushel of salt sold for eight hundred livres; a pound of sugar at ten crowns; a pair of woollen socks at sixty livres; a yard of coarse cloth at eight livres, such as they sell in France at forty sous per ell; a pound of shaggy tobacco, sixty-two livres; a pair of shoes, ten crowns; an ell of drab at twenty-four livres; an ell of velvet at a hundred crowns; and all other things in proportion. This necessarily

enhanced the price of food, which the country people brought in on the march : they sold a sheep at forty and fifty crowns ; a calf at a hundred crowns ; a hen at twelve livres ; a turkey at twenty-four livres ; the pound of meat was sold at the butcher's shop at forty and fifty sous, which was established in name of the king, with an exclusive permission to slaughter cattle, and thus to charge the meat, and with power to seize and carry off on the part of the king, all the cattle which they might find with the inhabitants, paying twenty-four livres per ox, the price at which they had taxed them, in name of the king, while these brave and unfortunate Canadians, who shed daily their blood in the king's service in defending that colony, were able to sell their oxen to private individuals at a hundred pistoles, and at twelve hundred livres a head. These brave people devoured by rapacious vultures, suffered without a murmur these oppressions, always saying at every rise, "that the king took all care that the colony should be saved." What subjects has the king lost in Canada and in Acadia ! We shall not find their equal in any part of Europe.

The scandalous traffic which was practised throughout the whole winter between the English and the French, whom one would have taken for merchants rather than for military (in place of an exchange which they ought to have made continually of musket shots), greatly enriched private individuals, and procured to the rich delicacies and refreshments, while these honest people of the colony, who with difficulty could obtain from the royal butcher's stand a pound of bad meat, for which they paid so dear, groaned under an accumulation of misery the most dreadful : badly nourished, and dragging out their lives by an exhaustion of their strength, and in a languor inexpressible ; but this was not the least of our sufferings ! Having lost all our artillery and munitions of war in the town of Quebec, we were no longer in a condition to hope for any favourable change in our state of affairs, and

we had not then any other prospect in view for the termination of our misery but by the capture of the colony in the approaching campaign, a situation frightful for those who entertained sentiments of honour, probity, and attachment to their country, and the good of the king's service.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1760.

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CAMPAIGN OF 1760, TO THE GENERAL CAPITULATION OF CANADA,  
WHICH TOOK PLACE AT MONTREAL, THE 7TH SEPTEMBER,  
1760.

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**H** OPE is a blessing of heaven, and a favour of Providence mingled with its afflictions, to soften the bitterness of its chastisements, and to prevent the unfortunate from falling under the weight of their misfortunes.\* It is natural for man, overwhelmed with adversity, to hope for a favourable change in his lot, however small may be the appearances on which his hopes may be founded, or of the mitigation of his pains and sufferings; and the mode of thinking of all individuals united and forming society ought to be analagous to that of every one in particular. The Canadians, without any foundation and without knowing why, still flattered themselves to be able to save their country, and never lost hope of it,

*can-  
say,  
boys*

\* She does not abandon even the dying. He agonises—he still feels life—he is not detached from it by thought. Death has knocked, before his heart has believed it possible to cease living. She penetrates into dungeons, where cheering hope dwells, near to the unfortunate who next day goes to receive his sentence; every time that the bolts begin to creak he believes his deliverance will enter with the gaoler. Entire years of slavery cannot eradicate this feeling of consolation. The contradictions, the diversities of views, these stormy returns, the flux, and the reflux, are as many effects of that hope which rejoices us and are never obliterated. “We never believe dangers,” says Machiavelli, “till they fall on our head, but entertain hope however far removed it may be.”

although in their then position without cannon, without munitions of war, and the enemy in possession of Quebec, it would require a miracle for that purpose. They occupied themselves during the winter only to form projects for retaking that city, altogether chimerical, and nowise susceptible of execution. Never did country give birth to more of them, nor more ridiculous and extravagant. Every body intermeddled therein, even from my lord the bishop and his priests, who gave theirs, but which were like the others, without common sense. Among the thousands of imaginary phantasies, that of taking the enemy by surprise, during the winter, by a forced march, and scaling the walls of Quebec, was the only one which had the least possibility of being successful. The plan of escalade was treated so seriously, during some time, that they had employed the work people to make ladders of wood; but having always regarded it as an extravagant reverie, and worthy of being the production of priests, I never ceased to combat it at all times, when they spoke of it, and it was always in the mouth of every one.

The lofty city of Quebec is situated upon the summit of a rock, which is more than two hundred feet in height, almost perpendicular, very steep and inaccessible throughout, except on the side of the Heights of Abraham, which are a continuation of the same mountain, almost to the level of the same high city, and terminating at Quebec by this steep rock. I was even charged, during some weeks, in conducting miners and other labourers in finishing the escarpment, and rendering the footpaths impracticable, by which one man could mount thereby to the low town; and I had only finished this work some days before the arrival of the English fleet. The low town of Quebec occupies a narrow space at the foot of the rock on the border of the river, and it has a communication with the upper town by a large street, but without any continuation to the houses on the slope of the hill.

A city of a great circumference, which has few troops,

yet low  
a garden

and where you can approach the walls, in different places, by giving a general alarm, in all quarters at the same time, in order to divide the force of the garrison, escalade could be attempted to be made in a situation as greatly dispersed as was ours, by risking all for all. A surprise in the obscurity of the night, would necessarily carry with it terror and disorder among those, whom it was intended to surprise. A terror communicates itself like lightning, the soldiers losing their presence of mind, not knowing the places of the town where they were making the escalade, nor where they were the most in danger. The thing is very different in a besieged town, where you are assured that the assault cannot be made but by breaches ; and the place there is pointed out where the besiegers have established their batteries without its being possible to be thereby deceived. But Quebec is not accessible, but on the side of the Heights of Abraham, and having nothing otherwise to fear, because from the steepness of the rock upon which it is built, the enemy upon the first alarm would naturally throw all his forces upon that part of the city, as the only place capable of being escaladed. Thus the enemy having then had about seven thousand troops in the city, almost as many of the force of our army as escaladed, it is strongly to be presumed that we would have lost more than one half, and that after having sustained a horrible carnage of our force, we would have been obliged in the end to let go our prize, and retrace ingloriously our steps. Supposing even that we could have mounted to the lower town by escalade, we would not have been thereby any further advanced, not being able to rest there for a quarter of an hour, without being there interred under the ruin of houses, by the fire plying from the higher town. The enemy would be able equally to dislodge us from thence, by their throwing down fire by fire pots, and other combustible materials from the height upon the tops of the houses. This extravagant project of escalade, after having been treated seriously, was

in the end sent by M. Levis to the list of others, the productions of women, priests, and ignoramuses ; substituting in its place a project truly reasonable, combined with justice, and which did honour to his talents and capacity.

M. Levis, in reporting to the Court the loss which we had sustained by the capture of Quebec, of all our artillery and munitions of war, gave at the same time his assurances that he would re-take that city in the spring, provided they would send from Europe, in the month of February, a vessel laden with cannon and munitions, in order to be in the river St. Lawrence before the English, and before Quebec in the course of the month of April.

M. Levis re-assembled our army as soon as the season permitted ; collected together a dozen pieces of miserable cannon, which had remained a long time out of use ; and departed from Montreal with his army about the commencement of April, to sit down before Quebec, snow being still upon the ground. He conducted so well his march that our army arrived at Cape Rouge without the English having been in any way apprized of it. It was impossible to capture Quebec with such a wretched artillery. His design was to invest the city, to open trenches, to advance his approaches with vigour and speed, in order not to have anything to do when the ship which he had asked of the Court should arrive, but to disembark the cannon, and mount them at once upon the batteries, which would be found immediately in a condition to batter in a breach. Every one seconded these views ; and if the ship which he expected had arrived, the city would not have been able to resist for twenty-four hours, and the colony would have still been saved.

The English learned that we were at Cape Rouge by the most whimsical and singular accident that it was possible to imagine : a manifest proof that the ablest general that has ever been in the world will not be able to guard himself against events which the mind of man could not foresee, and

which often frustrate the best combined plans.\* A boat with artillery having been sunk to the bottom, opposite Cape Rouge, by the ice, of which the river still swept down a great deal, a gunner saved himself upon a piece of ice, and the current carried down the piece of ice, with the gunner, without its being possible for him to extricate himself from it. The piece of ice having been carried down opposite to Quebec by the current, the English perceiving from the town the unfortunate gunner in the midst of the river, had compassion on him, and sent immediately boats to his succour, which they got there with great difficulty. He was then without consciousness or sign of life; but having revived with cordials which they gave him, he came, by little and little, to himself. As soon as he was in a condition to speak, they asked of him from whence he came. The gunner answered, with naïveté and innocence, that he had come from the French army at Cape Rouge! At first, they believed him to be in a delirium; but having examined him more fully, they came to the conclusion that he spoke without guile; and one may be able to judge their astonishment. Had it not been for this extraordinary adventure, M. Levis would have been able to make himself master of the city of Quebec; at least he would have been able to force the advanced posts, which they had at the village of St. Foix, which is about two leagues from the town of Quebec, and about a league from Cape Rouge, which M. Murray, the English general, took possession of at once; and they set fire to a magazine of powder which they had in the church of St. Foix, not having time to carry it off. It is very certain that fortune takes, more or less, a part in all the events of life, which is seen and evident in all the operations of war. These chances ought to be in favour of an enterprising general, as much as against him; and the Cardinal

\* We would, to all appearance, have taken Quebec by surprise, but for one of these caprices of fortune which often has as much part in influencing events in war as the genius of the greatest generals.



Mazarin seemed to be well founded, when he asked, if he, whom some one recommended to him, was fortunate. The English themselves have acknowledged a great superiority of genius and talents in Prince Eugene over their famous general, the Duke of Marlborough; but Marlborough was fortunate in all his enterprises by unforeseen events always in his favour, as much as Prince Eugene was unfortunate, and frustrated continually in the execution of his projects the best concerted and where he did not appear to want anything in his plans, by cross accidents. The Greeks have painted Timotheus sleeping, while Fortune, in another part of the picture, takes for him towns with threads.\* The strength of an army does not depend upon the personal luck of the general. Does Fortune conduct herself at the head of armies as she does at a gaming table in the midst of gamblers? It is a grand science of a general to know to correct bad fortune by prudence and circumspection, and to profit by run of success with rapidity.† The very smallest event which we might neglect at first as despicable, might produce an inconceivable chain of great effects. The boat, sunk at the battery at Cape Rouge, was the cause that the gunner found himself upon a piece of ice, in the middle of the river St. Lawrence, which inspired compassion in the English to save his life. The personal good fortune of the gunner, on the point of perishing, saved Quebec to the English, which but for him, M. Levis would have taken by surprise, which would have prevented the English from again attempting the conquest of

\*Timotheus, the Athenian general, was the most fortunate of men—even to taking cities while sleeping. Whether he wished to attribute his good fortune to his own merit, he became, at last, an unfortunate person.—*Erasmus's Eulogy on Folly.*

† It is also by small attentions that we arrive at accomplishing the greatest things. The general and his officers who neglect them, often fail in their enterprises, although very well concerted otherwise, and although they have had in appearance every thing which was necessary to see them crowned with the most fortunate success.

Canada, and, in appearance, would have been taken immediately. This town in the possession of the English will insure them the speedy possession of the whole colony of Canada. The conquest of Canada, after so much bloodshed, and money expended by the English in their different expeditions, inflamed their cupidity too greatly for them to consent to a peace, on reasonable terms, and engaged them to put far from them their enterprises upon colonies.

The possession of so many colonies conquered by the English, brought along with it the most unfortunate peace which France has been constrained to see made. Thus the boat sunk to the bottom by the ice at Cape Rouge, has been the proximate cause of the unfortunate situation to which this kingdom is at this day reduced; and has an influence by a counter stroke on all the affairs of Europe. Our army occupied the village of St. Foix, as soon as the English retired from it, and there passed the night of the 27th and 28th of April. The next day in the morning, M. Levis learned that the English army had left Quebec, and that it occupied the same ground as that of the battle of the 13th of September of the preceding year. M. Levis on this news, caused beat the "general" immediately, put his army in battle array, and marched forward at once to encounter M. Murray, the English general, in the meantime, without being convinced that he would have had the imprudence and rashness to wait him with determined resolution outside Quebec; a fault which the English general had made, of which the chastisement followed closely. The English had the advantage of ground, being in battle array upon a small eminence, with their front provided with twenty-two field pieces. The battle began by an attack upon a fort, which lay upon their right flank and our left, which was maintained for a long time with fierceness and obstinacy, by five companies of grenadiers, against as many Scotch Highlanders, both armies vying with each other to seize upon it. The grenadiers and Highlanders,

alternately in possession of this fort, were, notwithstanding, forced to evacuate it several times, each in their turn, before they had time to barricade it. These two antagonists, worthy the one of the other, were no sooner out by the windows, than they returned to the charge, and broke open the doors. In this murderous conflict, they were not provided with other arms, than the Highlanders with their dirks, and the grenadiers with their bayonets, using them with might and main. The grenadiers were reduced to forty men per company, and there would not have remained either Highlander or grenadier of the two armies if they had not, as by tacit and reciprocal agreement, abandoned the desire of occupying the fort. Our left, which was in a hollow, and distant from the English about thirty paces, was swept by their artillery, which they fired with grape shot. M. Levis perceiving their bad position, and wishing to remedy it, by making our army fall back to occupy an eminence parallel to that where the English were, sent M. Pause, an officer of the regiment of Guyenne, who acted as his aide-de-camp, to inform all the commanders of corps to make this movement in rear with their regiments; but whether it was that Pause had misconceived the intentions of M. Levis, or whether it was that he had badly delivered his orders, he ran along our line, ordering, on the part of M. Levis, every regiment to face about to retreat, without further explaining himself. It is hardly possible that the best troops that ever were in the world could be able to retreat at twenty paces from the enemy, without being thrown into disorder. Our army appeared to the English general to be in rout, and he quitted his position on the rising ground, to pounce upon us completely, and to pursue us. M. Dalquier, commandant of the battalion of the Berne regiment, who was at the left of our army, beside the troops of the colony—a brave, old officer, fierce and intrepid—as soon as Pause gave him the order to retreat, at the instant he turned to his soldiers and said to them, “At twenty paces

from the enemy, my boys, there is no time to retreat; bayonets to the mouth of your muskets; strike upon the enemy: that is best." He charged the enemy with impetuosity, seized their artillery immediately, and received, at the same time, a volley of musketry across the body, already quite covered with scars, but which did not hinder him from continuing to give his orders. M. Poularies, who was at the right of our army, with his Roussillon Royal Regiment and Canadians, the whole interval between the two wings of our army being already thrown back in disorder, seeing M. Dalquier advancing against the enemy, in place of retreating like the other regiments, he made, on the instant the wheel of a quarter circle, to the left, to fall upon the left flank of the English, which he outflanked with his regiment and the Canadians. The enemy, as soon as he perceived this movement on the part of M. Poularies, was struck with a frightful panic, broke loose; and the English soldiers all fled with such precipitation, that their officers were not able to restrain a single man. Our army pursued them hotly; and if the cry had not been raised among our force to stop, it would have possibly happened that we should have entered the city of Quebec pell-mell with them, not being at any distance from the gates. M. Poularies and M. Dalquier arrived in France in 1760, and were both made commandants of battalions; M. Bellecomb, brevet-major of the Royal Roussillon Regiment, and M. Montgay, captain in the regiment of Berne, both very fine men, whose figures attracted the attention of the Court, were made colonels. Bad fortune! the power of which shews itself cruelly in military life. Justice and deserved punishments appositely applied form the basis of the military art. Men do not conduct themselves save by honour or by interest; and there is no longer true emulation in a place where mediocrity, intrigue, favour, and influence annihilate the rights of merit, which produces elevation, boldness, and greatness of soul. Great talents are ignorant

of the art of sycophancy. They displease, in consequence, the clerks of the cabinet, who would wish them to fall down before them. They are humbugs, those vain, useless, mediocre men, who alone are the dispensers of favours. It is in the nature of things that men of that stamp detest officers of merit and sentiment, and prefer to them, cheats, flatterers, sycophants, and intriguers, disposed to everything.\*

We had about two thousand men killed, as well as wounded, in this battle, which was fought on the 28th of April, of which ten officers of the regular troops were of the number, besides many officers of the militia. M. Levis, at the beginning of the night, caused open trenches before the town, and they were pushed on, with such diligence and activity, that in a short time our batteries were ready to batter

\* "If such is the military condition of the state," says an author, "of which the sovereign (King of Prussia) is the greatest of his age, who instructs and commands his armies himself, forming, so to speak, the pomp of the Court, what ought to be that of those States where the sovereign is not a military man; where he does not see his troops; where he seems to disdain or ignore all that belongs to them; where the court, which always follows the impressions of the sovereign, is of consequence not military, where almost all the great rewards are obtained by intrigue; where the greater part of them become hereditary monopolies; where merit languishes without support; where credit can advance itself without talents, or make fortune, not regarding further to acquire reputation, but to amass riches; where they are able in one hour to be lavished with dignities and infamy, with decorations and ignorance, to serve badly the State, and to possess themselves of the best situations; to be defiled with public blame, and to enjoy the favour of the sovereign: If, while all other sciences are brought to perfection, that of war remains in infancy, that is the fault of governments which do not attach sufficient importance to it, who do not make it an object of public education, who do not direct towards this profession men of genius; who leave them to reap mere glory and advantages in frivolous or less useful sciences; who render the career of arms an ungracious career, in which talents are outwitted by intrigue, and prizes distributed by fortune."—*Discourse upon the actual state of Politics and Military Science in Europe (printed at Geneva) pages 121 and 130.* It is morally impossible for merit to conduct to fortune in a country corrupt, tyrannical, and venial. Merit there becomes a cause of exclusion. Virtue elevates the soul: it does not know to cringe, under mere patronage, nor to flatter vice and incapacity.

in a breach, if we had had cannon fit for the purpose ; but the greatest number of rubbish of cannons which M. Levis had been able to collect, were not more than a dozen—notwithstanding, this general mounted them upon our batteries for want of better, and fired them off from time to time, to keep up a good countenance ; but always husbanding our ammunition, of which we had but a small stock, with great economy. It only wanted the arrival of the vessel from Europe, charged with cannons and munitions of war, to have covered M. Levis with glory in saving the colony. M. Murray, the English general, often used to say that the first flag that should appear in the river St. Lawrence would decide the dispute, whether Quebec should remain with the English, or return to France, and that he only waited for that to deliver it up.

In short, the fate of this colony was verily decided by the arrival of three English frigates on the 7th of June. They ascended at once the river St. Lawrence, below Quebec, without stopping there, and destroyed from head to foot our frigates, which had wintered in Canada, with all the rest of our shipping, of which they burned some, and captured others. Their unexpected arrival, having always been hoped for from hour to hour, the arrival of the vessel which M. Levis had demanded from the Court, made us raise the siege, with much precipitation, without knowing for what, as we had left once before, to the enemy, after the affair of the 13th of September, all our tents and all our baggage, our army having been struck, as it were like a clap of thunder.

M. Vauclin, who commanded one of our frigates at Cape Rouge, the greatest force of which was not more than sixteen guns, fought like a lion against two English frigates of forty guns. He made such a beautiful defence that he commanded respect even from the English, having maintained the conflict as long as he had ammunition ; and when he had not another shot to fire, he landed such of his crew as were fit to serve,

remaining himself on board the frigate, with his wounded, and the French flag always flying on high at the top-mast. The English having cannonaded him for some time, and seeing that he no longer answered, they went alongside in the end in their boats, and cried to him to lower his flag. But Vauclin replied fiercely, that if they had a mind to take his ship, they could pull it down themselves. In fact, the English going on board, themselves cut the halyards of his flag, and treated M. Vauclin with all the regard which his intrepidity and heroic bravery deserved. This was not his first acquaintance with the English. He had formerly commanded a frigate of twenty-four guns at Louisbourg, during the siege, where he performed prodigies of valour. The English pressed upon him to make him offers of service; but he replied that he had no other favour to ask of them than to be sent at once to France; and the English made so great a point of his merit that they immediately dispatched a ship, express for him, ordering the English captain to be under the directions of M. Vauclin, and to land him in whatever part of France he might judge proper, granting him moreover the liberty of naming the passengers, whom he would allow to embark with him in the ship. I have always regarded this proceeding as truly great and noble on the one part as on the other. The generosity of the English is a fine eulogium on the bravery of Vauclin.

Our misfortune was then without remedy and without resource; and one can only compare Canada in this violent crisis to a sick man in the agonies of death, for whom the ordinary medicine of cordials is administered to ameliorate and soften the violence of his sufferings, without producing any effect for the cure of his malady. All our hopes were to obtain an honourable capitulation, at the general surrender of the colony, which could not be very far distant. M. Levis made our army take the road to Montreal, in order to wait there that dismal moment, and to make, if he had the means,

a last effort under the walls of that city; and he left at James Cartier two thousand men, under the command of M.

\* \* \* , with orders to retreat slowly, in proportion as the English advanced, but never to lose sight of them. On the arrival of our army at Montreal, not being able to have a store of provisions there on account of an extreme dearth, which would overwhelm us, M. Levis, to keep our army collected together, was obliged to send back all the regiments into their different quarters, where they had passed the winter, every inhabitant being obliged to maintain a soldier, in consideration of a fixed price, which was paid him by the commissary-general of the king.

M. Vaudreuil gave me an order to go to serve under the command of M. Bougainville, at the Isle of Nuts, where he commanded with a hundred men, of the regiments of Guyenne and Berry, which formed part of its garrison. It is situated on the river Chambly, about eight leagues south of Montreal, and at three-quarters of a league from the commencement of Lake Champlain. M. Bourlamarque, an officer of very great merit, who was master in general of all the different parts of the military art, had chosen this isle for our retiring there, at the time of the evacuation of Carillon the preceding year, when we were obliged to abandon the whole of Lake Champlain. He had it fortified as well as its situation was susceptible of, to serve as a frontier on that side; and this isle was very essential for preventing the English from descending the river of Champlain, a route which would have shortened greatly their road in getting to Montreal; besides that, by the Lake Ontario the road is much longer, and there are several dangerous rapids\* in the river St. Lawrence which it

\* That which they call in Canada "rapids," is when a river meets in its course a mountain, which, in place of falling as a cascade, descends the peak of the height with the swiftness of the flight of a bird—the canoes there descending, what they call leaping a rapid, by holding themselves always in the stream of the water; for fear lest they should dash themselves, are in an instant broke in pieces, without its being possible for



is necessary to avoid. The Isle of Nuts is about two hundred toises long, and about one hundred and fifty to two hundred toises broad. M. Bourlamarque had intrenched it, and he formed regular works on the ground. He had barricaded at the same time the two arms of the river, formed by the island, by two stockades (*d, d*) made by thick trees, attached end to end with hoops and crampets of iron. These stockades prevented the enemy from descending the river Chambly with vessels, which they had on Lake Champlain, and stopped there their shipping, which would have otherwise been able to pass that island in the darkness of the night; and Montreal would have then been immediately taken. Thus, as long as we were able to keep the Isle of Nuts, the English would not have been able to penetrate by Lake Champlain.

We learned at Montreal by some savages of the Five Nations that the bulk of the English army had come by the Rapids of the river St. Lawrence below Montreal, under the orders of General Amherst; and that M. Murray, with the English troops who had wintered at Quebec, behoved to ascend the river St. Lawrence, to form a junction with General Amherst in the island of Montreal; but we had no news of a third corps of troops of about four thousand men, who had gone in the month of July by Lake Champlain to besiege us in the Isle of Nuts, and which had preceded the other corps of English troops, by about five weeks.

The enemy having a good number of cannon, mortars, and howitzers, they established at once different batteries on the other side of the river, which took us in flank, rear, and on

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any person to be able to save himself from being dashed against the rocks. Able as the savages and Canadians may be in leaping these rapids, the art of which is to keep in the stream of the water, the canoe, guided by two small oars, one at the front and the other behind, they often perform leaps the most wonderful. Having no other way in Canada for crossing these vast woods than some footpaths on the banks of the rivers, to communicate from one habitation to another, these journeys and transports are always made by water.

every side, in so much, that no part of the island afforded a shelter from their artillery ; they had, besides that, many mortars. Having sustained six days' siege, enduring a continual brisk cannonade, without a moment's relaxation, one of their batteries being so near us on the side of the stockade, on the south, that they killed a great many of our soldiers at musket shot, and without having any casements to repose our force, M. Noquaire, an officer of the Royal Regiment of Roussillon, came up to us ; he had come from Montreal across the woods, under the conduct of some savages, charged with two letters for M. Bougainville, one of which was from M. Vaudreuil, and the other from M. Levis. This was at a most critical moment, M. Bougainville being then greatly embarrassed in the choice of the courses he ought to take, not having more than two days' provisions in his garrison, the seven or eight oxen, which he had, having been killed at the commencement of the siege by cannon shots ; and he had no reserve of fish, which almost furnished subsistence to the whole garrison, previous to the arrival of the English,—this river being very full of fish, and abundant in all sorts of fish.

The letter of M. Vaudreuil to M. Bougainville contained permission to make a capitulation, or to retreat from the Isle of Nuts, if that was practicable—that of M. Levis contained an order to hold the Isle of Nuts even to the last extremity. It seemed to me that it was already at the last extremity, not having provisions but for forty hours, and without any hope of succours. How is it possible to reconcile this contradiction between the two letters ? M. Bougainville showed them to me, and asked my advice. I did not see any other course to take than to attempt a retreat, since it would necessarily follow that we must surrender at discretion in two days, in which our provisions would be consumed ; and the reinforcement of a thousand men, which our garrison would afford at Montreal, appeared to me an essential object, if we still had the means of making head against the enemy, and of making




SCALE OF 1,000 JOSES

100 200 300 400 500


# SIEGE OF THE ISLE OF NUTS, 1760.

CHAMPLAIN  
COMPOSED OF TURP

LAKE  
ISLE




*Handwritten notes in the bottom right corner:*  
The map is a caricature of the Battle of the Clouds, which took place on September 26, 1755, during the Seven Years' War. The 'Isle of Nuts' is a reference to the British soldiers' habit of eating nuts during the battle. The map is a satirical take on military cartography, showing the 'siege' of the 'Isle of Nuts' by the French. The scale is in 'joses', a unit of measurement used by the British at the time. The map is signed 'W. Hill' in the bottom right corner.



- a. Isle of Nuts.
- b. English Batteries.
- c. Mortar Batteries, (blocking up).
- dd. Two Stockades for barricading the river.
- f. Battery of five pieces of cannon.
- gg. Place where we made our retreat.
- h. Meadow at Boileau.
- i. Mill at Tonquaut.
- k. Our intrenchments.
- l. Horn work and half moon.
- m. Redoubt at the entry of the river at the south which we had abandoned.
- n. A post of the enemy.

By M. The Chevalier de Johnstone.



a last effort under the walls of Montreal. Above all, M. Bougainville could risk nothing by conforming to the orders of M. Vaudreuil, who commanded in chief. The retreat was then decided on, concerted with accuracy and executed with all the good conduct possible, the success answering entirely to the arrangements which M. Bougainville had adopted.

The banks on the other side of the branch, on the north side of the river Chambly, being wet and marshy, there were no posts of the enemy nearer therefrom than that of the meadow of Boileau, (*h*) so the choice for our passage of the river naturally presented itself close (*d*) to the stockade on the north. Above all, it is thereby our route to get straight forward to Montreal in crossing the woods. M. Bougainville took all the prudent precautions possible. He ordered all the boats to be prepared and to be put in a state to be available in the passage. He caused all the boats of bark of trees, and boats of savages, to be assembled in order to prevent the possibility of any soldier having it in his power to desert and give notice to the enemy of the project of retreat. He gave out in orders that all the garrison should be under arms at ten o'clock at night, ready to march, observing a profound silence, without the least noise, by the clanking of their arms or otherwise. And he ordered M. Bergue, an officer of the colonial troops, to remain in the Isle of Nuts with a detachment of forty men, and to keep up the briskest fire from our batteries, which consisted of seven or eight pieces of cannon, during the whole time that would be occupied in passing the river, in order to prevent the enemy from learning our manœuvre, and to continue firing as long as he had ammunition, to conceal our retreat, for as long a time as it was possible.

We commenced our embarkation towards ten o'clock at night in two coasting vessels, with some long boats, which went and came continually, without the enemy ever appearing or suspecting our manœuvre, although they were as near to us

as to be able to hear them speak. At midnight the entire force had passed; and the whole was executed without the least noise, disorder, or confusion, a thing very rare on such occasions. M. Bergue acquitted himself perfectly of his orders, and managed so well his ammunition that he had wherewith to fire at intervals, even an hour after mid-day the next day, that he hoisted a white flag to capitulate; we believing then that we were nearly arriving at Montreal; and the English still ignorant of our retreat, accorded him a capitulation the most honorable. As soon as the whole force had passed, we put ourselves in march, in crossing the wood to proceed straight forward, going at double pace, and in file one after the other. We did not lose, in the course of the siege, but about twenty-four men, a very inconsiderable loss for so terrible a cannonade, to which we had been exposed during sixteen days, without an instant's relaxation, besides the bombs and shells which they threw upon us continually. Happily for us the ground of the island was sandy, for if there had been stones or pebbles we would have lost an infinite number of men.

After having marched from midnight to mid-day, always in quick time, running through the frightful swamps, where we often sunk even to the navel, and without resting an instant to repose ourselves, in place of being close to the meadow opposite Montreal, as we believed, we were only about half a league from the Isle of Nuts, near to the meadow of Boileau, not having done anything but turned about continually nearly in the same place, without perceiving it, owing to the fault of our guides, who did not know the roads, and we had none of the savages along with us. Of all the thirty persons, who presented themselves as guides to us, there was not a single one of them capable of conducting us to Montreal across the wood. We were so close to the meadow of Boileau, where the enemy were encamped, that a grenadier of the regiment of Berry approached so near as to carry



over a horse to the English, to give to his commandant, M. Cormier, reduced by fatigue, and not able to march further, but who saved himself by means of this gift of his grenadier. Having lost all hopes of being able to reach Montreal by crossing the wood, we then took the route to Fort St. John, which is situated upon the river Chambly, about four leagues further below the Isle of Nuts, and about five leagues by land from Montreal. I was so overcome with fatigue, and so totally exhausted, not being able but with the greatest pain to trail my legs, that I thought a thousand times of lying down to finish my days, but the fear of falling into the hands of savages connected with the English, and the idea of the cruelties and torments which they exercised over their prisoners, making them die under the cruellest sufferings, at a small fire, after having exhausted their invention of horrors which disgrace human nature—the terror of that gave me from time to time new strength, when ready to succumb, and spurred me on. At length, arriving towards four o'clock in the afternoon, at a cultivated place about a league and a half from Fort St. John, where M. Bougainville caused his detachment to halt, to rest themselves, and to wait for the laggards behind, I observed a boat which was going to depart for Fort St. John, and there remained for me only strength sufficient to throw myself inside of it. We lost in this march about twenty-four men. Those who had remained behind, not being vigorous enough to support this rough march, were left as victims of it to the savages of the enemy. I have very often found myself in these painful and fatiguing positions, but never in any, where I experienced so much suffering as in this cruel journey.

On arriving at Fort St. John, I saw M. Poularies on the bank of the river, who told me that they had learnt the news of our retreat from the Isle of Nuts, and that he had been sent there with his regiment to support us in case of our being attacked. I was so much done up that I was with difficulty

able to speak. It had been fine weather, and very hot. I left the boat, and threw myself immediately into the water, in full dress, not having sufficient strength to take off my clothes, which were soaked with mud, where I remained, lying with my head only out of the water, during more than an hour, M. Poularies having had the complacency to seat himself on the bank of the river to keep me company. On coming out of the water, I felt myself very much refreshed, and M. Poularies having regaled me with a very good supper, with a bed there to pass the night, the next day in the morning, not feeling almost anything more of my fatigues, and finding myself in a state to march, I started to proceed on my way to Montreal, performing on foot five miles of wretched road, by a track, which there is from Fort St. John to Montreal.

We began to be hemmed in on the island of Montreal on all sides. The enemy having made himself master of the river of Chambly, by the capture of the Isle of Nuts, M. Amherst approached it with his army on the other side by the rapids in the river St. Lawrence; and M. Murray ascended the river with troops who had wintered at Quebec, accompanied by ships of which there was one of fifty guns, which incited the admiration of the city of Montreal; for till then they had never seen a ship of more than twenty-four tons, which had ventured to come from Quebec to Montreal, having always singularly neglected to sound the river. M. Murray conducted himself as an able man and an officer of capacity. He had taken five weeks to the sixty leagues which there are from Quebec to Montreal; and he put us more at fault by his political conduct than by his arms. He stopped in the villages, caressed the Canadians whom he found in their houses; hunted our army with hunger and misery, and he gave provisions to these poor unfortunate people ready to perish for want of subsistence; he burned some houses of those who were at Montreal in our army, publishing through-

out all an amnesty, and offering good treatment to the Canadians who should return to their habitations there to live peaceably: in short, flattering the one, and inspiring the other with terror, he succeeded so well that it was with much difficulty that in the end that we were able to keep the inhabitants at Montreal, and prevent them from returning to their houses. Verily, we had need of nothing but to put on a good countenance, for the three united armies of the enemy made up a corps of twenty thousand men, thus there was no possibility of being able to make head against them.

The enemy had so well combined their operations this year, that on the 7th of September, towards two o'clock in the afternoon, the advanced posts of the army of General Amherst came in sight of Montreal on the side of the China gate; and two hours after, M. Murray appeared with his army on the side of the gate of Quebec.

The town of Montreal was not any wise susceptible of the least defence. It is surrounded with walls without being fortified, and which sufficed only to afford the inhabitants a shelter from the incursions of savages in the early period of that settlement; not foreseeing, that in the end, there would be in that country, armies of regular troops, who would make war in Canada methodically the same as in Europe. We were in the meantime completely shut up in this dismal place, which was a thousand times worse than a simple intrenchment in a bare country, and which could not resist a cannonade two hours. It required merely the time to get under these walls from the cannon shots, which were not a whit better than the garden walls, to enter there in full speed and take us at discretion; and this with the greater certainty that there were not provisions in the city sufficient for nourishing the three thousand men of our army which remained to us, for three days, the greater part of the inhabitants having been obliged to return to their houses, in default of having provisions to give them to subsist on, and not improper un-

willingness to fight; for these Canadians are brave as well as docile, submissive and easy to manage; besides, they are patient under their sufferings, active as savages, of a strong temperament, and indefatigable in campaigns. They are better militia than any in the world.

The night of the 7th and 8th September was passed in preliminaries, and in the discussion of the articles of general capitulation for the colony; but in the morning M. Amherst granted it to us a thousand times more favourable than we had any right to expect in a position so very unfortunate.

P-17

## CAPITULATION.

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*Articles of Capitulation, concluded between His Excellency General Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty in North America, and His Excellency the Marquis of Vaudreuil, Grand Cross of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, Governor and Lieutenant-General of His Most Christian Majesty in Canada.*

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ARTICLE 1.—Twenty-four hours after the signature of the present capitulation the English general, Amherst, shall take possession of the gates of the city of Montreal by the troops of His Britannic Majesty, and the English garrison shall not enter the place till the French troops shall have evacuated it.

*Answer.*—All the garrison of Montreal shall lay down their arms, and shall not serve during the present war. Immediately after the signature of the present capitulation, the king's troops shall take possession of the gates, and place the necessary guards for preserving good order in the city.

ARTICLE 2.—The troops and militia which are in garrison in the city of Montreal shall depart by the gate of \* \* \*, with all the honours of war, six pieces of cannon, and a mortar, which shall be put on board the vessel in which the Marquis of Vaudreuil shall embark, and ten charges for every piece. The same honours shall be granted to the garrison of Three Rivers.

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ARTICLE 3.—The troops and the militia in garrison in the fort of James Cartier, in the island of St. Helen, and in the other forts, shall be treated in the same manner, and shall have the same honours. The troops stationed at Montreal, or at Three Rivers, or at Quebec, to be there embarked and conducted forthwith to the first port in France by the shortest route. Those which are in our posts upon our frontiers, on the side of Acadia at Detroit, at Michelimakinak, and at other places, shall enjoy the same honours, and be treated in the same manner.

*Answer.*—All the troops not to serve during the present war, and shall equally lay down their arms, till the rest is granted them.

ARTICLE 4.—The militia, after leaving the towns, forts, and posts above-mentioned, shall return home without being molested upon any pretext whatever, on account of having borne arms.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 5.—The troops which occupy the country shall raise their camps, and march—drums beating—with their arms, baggage, and artillery, to join the garrison of Montreal; and shall be treated as it, in all respects.

*Answer.*—These troops must, the same as the others, lay down their arms.

ARTICLE 6.—On the one side and the other, pardon shall be granted to the subjects of His Britannic, and His Most Christian, Majesty—the soldiers, militiamen, and seamen, who have deserted or quitted the service of their sovereigns, and carried arms in North America. They shall return to their respective countries, except such of them as shall remain where they are, without being sought after or molested.

Refused.

ARTICLE 7.—The magazines, the artillery, arquebuses, swords, munitions of war, and generally, all that pertains to His Most Christian Majesty, as well in the towns of Montreal

and Three Rivers, as in the forts and posts mentioned in Article 3, shall be delivered up, upon exact inventories, to commissaries, who shall be named to receive them in name of His Britannic Majesty. Copies of said inventories shall be delivered to the Marquis of Vaudreuil.

*Answer.*—This is all that can be demanded under this article.

ARTICLE 8.—Officers, soldiers, militiamen, seamen, and even Indians, detained on account of their wounds or maladies, whether in hospitals or in private houses, shall enjoy the privileges of cartel, and shall be treated accordingly.

*Answer.*—The sick and wounded shall be treated as our own people.

ARTICLE 9.—The English general engages himself to send back to their homes the Indians and Americans who are belonging to his army, immediately after the signature of the present capitulation. And in the meantime, in order to prevent all disorder on the part of those who may wish not to depart, the said general shall grant safe guards to all persons who may wish to leave it, whether in town or in the open country.

*Answer.*—The first part of this article is *refused*. The Indians of our army have never committed cruelties. Besides, we will take care to maintain good order.

ARTICLE 10.—The general of His Britannic Majesty shall be responsible for all disorders on the part of his troops, and obliges himself to pay the damages which they may do in the towns and open country.

Answered by the preceding Article.

ARTICLE 11.—The English general shall not oblige the Marquis of Vaudreuil to leave the city of Montreal before the \* \* \* and no person shall be lodged in his house till he has left it. The Chevalier de Levis, commandant of the land forces, the principal officers and majors of the land forces, and those of the Colony, engineers, officers of artillery and

commissaries of war, shall remain also at Montreal, till the said day, and shall keep possession of their lodgings. The same thing shall be observed with regard to M. Bigot, the resident, the commissaries of marine, and the secretaries of which the said M. Bigot may stand in need; and no person shall be lodged at the residency till he shall have left it.

*Answer.*—The Marquis of Vaudreuil, and all his gentlemen, shall be masters of their houses; and shall embark when the ships of His Majesty shall be ready to sail for Europe. We will provide for them, besides, all the accommodation possible.

ARTICLE 12.—The most commodious vessel shall be found to avail for conducting M. Vaudreuil to the nearest port of France, by the most direct route. They shall furnish the necessary commodities for the said M. Vaudreuil; for M. Rigaud, the governor of Montreal; and for the suite of the general. The vessel ought to be equipped in a convenient manner, at the expense of His Britannic Majesty; and the Marquis of Vaudreuil shall carry with him his papers without their being examined, his equipages, his plate, utensils, his baggages, and those of his suite.

Granted, under reserve of the Archives, which shall be necessary for the government of the country.

ARTICLE.—13.—If before or after the embarkation of the Marquis of Vaudreuil, news of peace shall arrive, and that by the treaty Canada remains with His Most Christian Majesty, the Marquis of Vaudreuil in that case shall restore to Quebec or to Montreal all things in their original state, under the dominion of His Most Christian Majesty; and the present capitulation shall be null and of no effect.

*Answer.*—Everything which the King may be able to perform in regard to this matter shall be observed.

ARTICLE 14.—Two vessels shall be furnished to convey to France the Chevalier de Levis, the principal officers, and the staff major of the land forces, the engineers, officers of artil-



lery and their suites. These vessels shall be equipped and provided with all necessary commodities. The said officers shall take with them their papers without being examined, as well as their equipages and baggages. Those among them who are married shall have liberty to take with them their wives and children, to whom also provisions shall be furnished.

Granted, on condition that the Marquis of Vaudreuil and all the officers, of whatever rank they may be, shall deliver to us all the charts and plans of the country.

ARTICLE 15.—There shall also be furnished for the passage of M. Bigot, Resident, and his suite, a vessel in which there shall be all convenient commodities for him and the persons he shall take with him. He shall equally carry along with him his papers without their being examined, his equipages, his plate, his baggage, and those of his suite. This vessel shall also be equipped as is mentioned above.

Granted, under the same reserves as in the preceding Article.

ARTICLE 16.—The English General shall also order to be furnished the vessels necessary and most commodious for conveying to France M. Longveuil, Governor of Three Rivers; the Staff Major of the Colony, and the Commissaries of the Marine. They shall therein embark, their families, domestics, baggage, and equipages; and there shall be provided at the expense of His Britannic Majesty, all things necessary for their transit.

Granted.

ARTICLE 17.—Officers and soldiers, as well troops of the line as of the Colony, and officers of Marine, which shall happen to be in the Colony, shall in like manner embark for France; and there shall be given to them vessels sufficient and commodious. The officers of the land and marine who are married, shall take with them their families, and they shall all be at liberty to embark their servants and baggage.

Their vessels shall be victualled in a manner convenient and sufficient, at the expense of His Britannic Majesty.

Granted.

ARTICLE 18.—Officers, soldiers, and all those who follow the troops, shall be allowed to send to enquire, before their departure, for the baggages which they may have in the country without any impediment.

Granted.

ARTICLE 19.—The English General shall furnish an hospital ship for the sick and wounded officers, soldiers, and seamen, who shall be found to be in a state to be conveyed to France ; and the vessel shall in like manner be victualled at the expense of His Britannic Majesty. The same thing shall be done in regard to the other sick and wounded officers, soldiers, or seamen, until their health shall be re-established. They shall be at liberty to take with them their wives, children, domestics, and baggage. And the land soldiers and seamen shall not be enticed or forced to enter the service of His Britannic Majesty.

Granted.

ARTICLE 20.—There shall be left a Commissary and King's Secretary to take care of the hospitals, and all that belongs to the service of His Most Christian Majesty.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 21.—The English General shall also provide a ship for conveying to France with their families, domestics, and equipages, the officers of the Supreme Court of Justice, Police, and Admiralty, the same as those who hold commissions or brevets of His Most Christian Majesty ; and all other officers. They shall be in like manner furnished with all necessary provisions at the expense of His Britannic Majesty. They shall, notwithstanding, be at liberty to remain in the Colony, if they shall judge proper to regulate their affairs, or to retire into France when they please.

Agreed to ; but if they have any papers relating to the

government of the country, they shall deliver them up to us.

ARTICLE 22.—If there are any military officers whose affairs demand their presence in the Colony till the ensuing year, they shall be at liberty to remain there after having obtained permission from the Marquis of Vaudreuil, and without being accounted prisoners of war.

*Answer.*—All those whose affairs particularly require that they should be in the country, and who shall have for that purpose permission from the Marquis of Vaudreuil, shall be allowed to remain till their affairs shall be regulated.

ARTICLE 23.—The Commissary of provisions shall have liberty to remain in Canada till the ensuing year, in order to be able to discharge the debts which he has contracted in the Colony on account of what has been furnished to him; but if he prefers going into France this year, he shall be obliged to leave, till the next year a person to do his work; and this person shall be at liberty to carry with him his papers without being inspected. His clerks also shall be allowed to remain in the Colony, or to go to France, and in this latter case they shall be provided with a passage and subsistence on board of vessels of His Britannic Majesty, for them, their families, and their baggage.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 24.—The provisions and ammunition which shall be found in the stores of the Commissary, as well in the towns of Montreal and Three Rivers, and in the country, shall be preserved to him; the said provisions belonging to him and not to the King, and he shall be at liberty to sell them to the French or to the English,

*Answer.*—Everything which is actually in the stores intended for the use of the troops, ought to be delivered to the English commissaries for the King's troops.

ARTICLE 25.—A passage to France shall also be granted on board ships of His Britannic Majesty, and likewise necessary provisions, to the officers of the East India Company who wish to go thither; and they shall take with them their families, domestics, and baggage. The principal agent of the Company, in case he shall wish to go to France, shall have it in his power to leave, till the ensuing year, such person as he shall judge proper to regulate the affairs of the said Company, and to recover the sums which are due to it. The principal agent shall take possession of all papers belonging to the said Company, and they shall not be subject to examination.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 26.—The said Company shall retain in property the silks and beavers which they may have in the city of Montreal. They shall not be touched there upon any pretext whatever; and all necessary facilities shall be provided to the principal agent for conveying to France, this year, these beavers, on board vessels of His Britannic Majesty, on payment of freight at the same rate as the English would have to pay.

Agreed for what shall pertain to the Company or individuals; but if His Most Christian Majesty has any part there, it shall be delivered to the king.

ARTICLE 27.—The free exercise of the Catholic-Apostolic Roman religion shall subsist in its entirety, in such manner that all the states, and people of towns and countries, places and distant posts, shall continue to assemble in the churches, and frequent sacraments, as heretofore, without being molested in any manner, directly or indirectly. The English government shall oblige these peoples to pay to the priests the tithes and all the taxes which they were accustomed to pay under the government of His Most Christian Majesty.

Granted as to the free exercise of their religion; the obligation to pay the tithes to the priests shall depend upon the king's pleasure.

ARTICLE 28.—The Chapters, Priests, Curates, and Missionaries, shall continue with the utmost liberty their exercises and their functions in the parishes, in the towns, and open countries.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 29.—The Grand Vicars nominated by the Chapter to administer the Diocese during the vacancy of an Episcopal See, shall have liberty to make their residence in the parishes of the towns or open country as they shall judge it proper. They shall have liberty on all occasions to visit the different parishes of the Diocese with the ordinary ceremonies, and to exercise all jurisdiction which they exercised under the dominion of the French. They shall enjoy the same rights in case of death or future Bishop, which will be made mention of in the following Article.

Agreed to, unless in so far as regards the following Article.

ARTICLE 30.—If by the Treaty of Peace Canada shall remain in the power of His Britannic Majesty, His Most Christian Majesty shall continue to nominate the Bishop of the colony, which shall always be of the Roman Communion, and under the authority of which the peoples shall exercise the Romish religion.

Refused.

ARTICLE 31.—The Bishop, in case of need, shall establish new parishes to provide for the construction of a Cathedral and his Episcopal Palace, and shall be entitled in the meantime to make his residence in the towns or parishes, as he shall judge proper. He shall be at liberty to visit his Diocese with his ordinary ceremonies, and to exercise all the jurisdiction which his predecessor exercised under the French dominion, except that they shall exact from him an oath of allegiance or a promise that he shall do nothing contrary to the service of His Britannic Majesty.

*Answer.*—This Article is comprehended in the preceding.

ARTICLE 32.—The religious corporations shall maintain their constitutions and privileges. They shall continue to observe their rules. They shall be exempt from lodging military men, and they shall be defended from trouble in their religious exercises, or their monasteries being entered into. Safe passports shall be given to those demanding them.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 33.—The preceding Article shall in like manner be executed in regard to Corporations of Jesuits, and Recollets, and Priests of the House of St. Sulpice, at Montreal. These last and the Jesuits shall preserve their right to nominate certain Curates and Missionaries as heretofore.

Refused until the pleasure of the king is known.

ARTICLE 34.—All the Corporations and all the Priests shall preserve their moveable effects, the properties and revenues of their lordships, and other endowments which they possess in the colony, of whatsoever kind they may be; and these same endowments shall preserve their privileges, rights, honours, and exemptions.

Granted.

ARTICLE 35.—If the Canons, Priests, Missionaries, and Priests of Seminaries, Stranger Missions of St. Sulpice, Jesuits, and Recollets, should wish to go to France, they shall be afforded a passage on board ships of His Britannic Majesty; and they shall have liberty to sell, in whole or in part, the goods, moveable and immoveable, which they possess in the colony, either to the French or to the English, without the least obstacle or hindrance on the part of His Britannic Majesty. They shall have it in their power to take with them or to send into France the profits, of whatever kind they may be, of said effects sold, on paying freight as is set forth in Article 26; and such of the said Priests as may wish to depart this year shall have their provisions during the passage at the expense of His Britannic Majesty, and may carry with them their baggage.

*Answer.*—They shall be entitled to dispose of their effects, and to send into France the product of them, also to proceed thither in the same manner with all that belonged to them.

ARTICLE 36.—If by the Treaty of Peace, Canada shall remain with His Britannic Majesty, all the French Canadians, Acadians, merchants, and other persons who wish to retire into France, shall have permission to do so from the English general, who shall procure them a passage. Nevertheless, if at present, till this decision be given, any French or Canadian merchants, or other persons, should desire to proceed to France, they shall equally have the permission of the English general. And both the one and the other may take with them their families, servants, and baggage.

Granted.

ARTICLE 37.—The Lordships, Land Owners, Officers, Civil and Military, the Canadians, both of the towns and open countries, the French established in trading throughout the whole extent of the colony of Canada, and all other persons whomsoever, shall preserve peaceably the entire property and possessions of their effects, coins, and means, moveable and immoveable, their merchandises, furniture, and other effects, as well as their ships. They shall not be touched, nor the least damage done to them, under any pretext that it is possible to conceive. They shall be permitted to keep, rent, or to sell them, either to the French or to the English, and to carry the proceeds in bills of exchange, furs, species, blank line, or other produce, when they shall judge it proper to proceed to France, on payment of freight as it is provided in Article 26. They shall also have the furs which pertain to them in the high up posts, and which may be on the road to Montreal. In consequence, it shall be permitted to them to send this year, or the ensuing year, proper barges to go to collect these said furs, which shall remain in these posts.

Agreed to, as in Article 26.

ARTICLE 38.—All the people who have left Acadia, and who shall be found in Canada, comprising therein the frontiers of Canada on the side of Acadia, shall be treated the same as the Canadians, and enjoy the same privileges.

*Answer.*—It belongs to the king to dispose of these ancient subjects; in the meantime they shall enjoy the same privileges as the Canadians.

ARTICLE 39.—Any of the Canadians, Acadians, or French, who are actually in Canada, and on the frontiers of the colony, on the side of Acadia at the Strait, at Michelimakinak, and other places and posts of the higher territories, any soldiers, married or unmarried, remaining in Canada, shall not be conducted or transported to English colonies, or to Old England, nor shall they be molested on account of having carried arms.

Agreed to, except in regard to Canadians.

ARTICLE 40.—The Savages or Indians, allies of His Most Christian Majesty, shall be maintained in their habitations; if they choose to remain there, they shall not be molested on any pretext whatever for having carried arms, or for having served His Most Christian Majesty. They shall also have the same as the French, toleration of religion and keep their Missionaries. The actual Vicars' general, and the Bishop, when the Episcopal See shall be full, shall have liberty to send them new Missionaries, when they shall judge it necessary.

Accorded, except the last Article, which has been already refused.

ARTICLE 41.—The French, Canadians, and Acadians, of whatever rank they may be, who shall remain in the colony, shall not be forced to take up arms against His Most Christian Majesty or his allies, directly or indirectly, on any occasion that this might be. The British government exact only from them a strict neutrality.

*Answer.*—They shall become subjects of the king.

ARTICLE 42.—The French Canadians and Acadians shall



continue to be governed according to the custom of Paris, and following the usages established for this country. They shall not be subject to any other imposts than those which were established under the French dominion.

Answered by the preceding Articles, and particularly by the last.

ARTICLE 43.—The papers of the government shall remain, without exception, in the power of the Marquis of Vaudreuil, and go to France with him. These papers shall not be examined under any pretext whatever.

Agreed to, under the reservation already made.

ARTICLE 44.—The papers of the residency, of the cabinets, of the comptroller of the marine, of the old and new treasuries, the king's magazines, of the cabinet of revenues, and ordnances of St. Maurice, shall remain under the power of M. Bigot, the intendent, and shall be embarked along with him in the same vessel which is appointed to convey him to France. These papers shall not be examined.

The same thing for this Article.

ARTICLE 45.—The registers and other papers of the supreme council of Quebec, of the provost and admiralty of the said city, those of the supreme jurisdiction of the Colony, the minutes and notarial acts of the cities and the open country, and generally the acts and other documents which serve to prove the goods and fortunes of citizens remaining in the Colony,—with the presses of the jurisdictions to which these papers belong.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 46.—The inhabitants and merchants shall enjoy all the privileges of commerce, with the same favours and with the same conditions granted to the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, as well in the higher territories, as in the interior of the colony.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 47.—The negroes and peasants of both sexes

shall remain in their condition of slavery, in the power of the French and Canadians to whom they belong. Their masters shall have liberty to keep them in their service in the colony, or to sell them; and shall also have it in their power to instruct them in the Romish religion.

Agreed to, under reserve of those who have been made prisoners.

ARTICLE 48.—The Marquis of Vaudreuil, the general and the staff officers of the land forces, the governors and the staff officers of the different places of the colony, the civil and military officers, and all other persons who shall quit the colony, or who are already absent, shall have liberty to nominate and appoint attornies, who shall act for them and in their name in the administration of their effects, moveable and immoveable, until the peace; and if by the treaty between the two Crowns, Canada shall not return under the French dominion, these officers and other persons, or their attornies, shall have permission to sell their feifs, houses, or other estates, and their moveables, goods, and to carry or send to France the proceeds, in bills of exchange, specie, furs, or other produce, as it is provided for in Article 37.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 49.—The inhabitants and other persons who have suffered any damage in their effects, moveable or immoveable, who remained at Quebec under the faith of the capitulation of that city, shall have it in their power to make representation to the British Government, who shall render just judgment against those whom it may concern.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 50.—The present capitulation shall be inviolably executed in all these respects, and in good faith, on the one part and the other, notwithstanding any infraction and other pretexts in regard to preceding capitulations, and without using reprisals.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 51.—The English general obliges himself, that in case there shall remain any Indians, after the surrender of this city, to prevent their entry into the towns, and prevent them from insulting in any manner the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty.

*Answer.*—Care shall be taken that the Indians shall not be guilty of any insult to the subjects of His Most Christian Majesty.

ARTICLE 52.—The troops and other subjects of His Most Christian Majesty, who ought to proceed to France, shall be embarked, at the latest, in five days after the signature of the present capitulation.

Answered as in Article 11.

ARTICLE 53.—The troops and other subjects of His Most Christian Majesty who are destined to proceed to France, shall remain lodged and encamped in the city of Montreal, and other posts which they actually occupy, until they shall embark to depart. In the meantime, passports shall be granted to those who require them, for the different places of the colony, in order to take care of their effects.

Granted.

ARTICLE 54.—All officers and soldiers of the troops in the service of France who are prisoners in New England, and those who have been taken in Canada, shall be sent back as soon as possible to France, either to treat there for their ransom or their exchange, conformable to cartel; and if any of these officers have business in Canada, they shall have liberty to go there.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 55.—In regard to the officers of militia, or militiamen and Acadians who are prisoners in New England, they shall be sent back to their own countries respectively.

Done at Montreal, the 8th of September, 1760.

(Signed)

VAUDREUIL.

Agreed to, except in regard to the Acadians.

Done at the camp before Montreal, the 8th of September, 1760.

(Signed) JEFF. AMHERST.

These articles are a fine specimen of terms of capitulation, and equally honourable to both parties.—Ed.

## CAPITULATION OF QUEBEC BY M. RAMSAY,

*The 18<sup>th</sup> of September, 1760.*

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ARTICLE 1.—M. Ramsay demands that the honors of war shall be granted to his garrison, and that they shall be conducted in safety to the army of the king by the shortest road, with arms, baggage, six field pieces of cannon, two mortars, or a twelve-pounder shot shell.

*Answer.*—The garrison—composed of land troops, marine, and seamen—shall leave the place with arms and baggage; drums beating, colours flying, and two pieces to fire. They shall be embarked the most conveniently possible for being transported to the first port of the realm of France.

ARTICLE 2.—The inhabitants shall be maintained in possession of their houses, estates, effects, and privileges.

Agreed to: provided they lay down their arms.

ARTICLE 3.—They shall not be exposed to any bad treatment on account of having carried arms in defence of the place, having been forced to serve as militia, following the usual custom of the respective colonies of the two Crowns.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 4.—None of the effects shall be touched which appertain either to the officers or inhabitants absent from the place.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 5.—No persons settled in the city shall be obliged to quit their dwellings before there shall be arranged a definite treaty between their Most Christian and British Majesties.

Very well.

ARTICLE 6.—The public exercise of the Catholic Apostolic and Romish religion shall be maintained. They shall grant the same safeguards to the houses of the clergy and to the monasteries: above all, to the palace of the Bishop of the Diocese, which is animated with zeal for religion, and full of charity for his flocks, desirous of residing constantly in the city of Quebec, in order there to exercise freely and with decency, and where he may judge proper, his Episcopal authority in whatever regards the duties attached to his character, and the functions requisite to the sacred mysteries of the Catholic Apostolic and Romish religion, till the possession of Canada shall be decided by a treaty between the Most Christian King and the King of Great Britain.

The Romish religion shall be exercised freely. All religious persons and the Bishop shall have passports, with liberty to pass and repass where their functions call them, and that till the arrangement spoken of is made.

ARTICLE 7.—The garrison shall deliver up, in good faith, the artillery and munitions of war, of which they shall prepare a list.

Undecided.

ARTICLE 8.—The sick and wounded, commissaries, chaplains, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, and other employés in the hospitals, shall be treated conformably to the cartel established between the Courts of Versailles and London, the 6th day of February of the present year.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 9.—Before the gates shall be given up to the English troops to enter the city, their general shall send there some soldiers, who shall be placed as safeguards to the churches, convents, and hotels.

Granted.

ARTICLE 10.—The Commandant of the city of Quebec shall have permission to despatch an express to the Marquis

of Vaudreuil, governor-general, to inform him of the surrender of the place. He shall be equally permitted to give advice thereof by letters to the minister at Versailles.

Agreed to.

ARTICLE 11.—The present capitulation shall be observed in all its force and tenor, without any pretext or motive of reprisals, or reason of non-execution of every prior capitulation, being able to serve as the foundation for support of its infringement.

Copies of this Convention, stipulated between us, have been signed in the camp before Quebec to-day, the 18th September, 1759.

(Signed)

„

CHARLES SAUNDERS.

GEORGE TOWNSHEND of Ramsay.

## APPENDIX.

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*Conjectures by M. the Chevalier on the Manœuvres of the  
Disposition of March of M. Braddock.*

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
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THE disposition of M. Braddock was found at the Belle River among the papers of that English general, and sent to Louisbourg, where I saw it, without any explanation of the manner of manœuvring in that order of march, so as to get into battle array. Finding it at the first glance of the eye very singular, I sent a copy of it to M. the Marshal of Thomond, with whom I had always kept up a correspondence by letters; but my Lord Thomond confined himself to thanking me, without communicating to me what he thought of it; and I sent another copy of it to M. Surlaville, our old troop major at Louisbourg, who answered me that that order of march was very defective, and that with that disposition the English general would not have been able to avoid letting himself be beaten. On examining it, it appeared to me to be the practice followed throughout all Europe for crossing a wood,—an army under three columns, the provisions, the munitions of war, artillery and baggage forming that of the centre; and I hazarded my ideas upon the manœuvre of these columns. Every company appears, according to the plan, into three platoons, of which I suppose the greatest part of the three is commanded by the captain, the second by the lieutenant, and the third, the one most distant from the carriages, by a sergeant,—not having an appearance but of two files of four or six men deep; the platoon of the sergeant should be able







FIGURE, 1.






FIGURE, 2.



FIGURE, 3.







to be destined to fight on the high road, and hold in check the light troops, who might vault through the skirt of the wood. If the enemy should appear in sufficiently great numbers to fear being attacked, we should form (*fig. 2*) into platoons of column from the right one to the right; and to the platoons of the column of the left one to the left, making them march immediately in advance, in a straight line of the platoon of the sergeant. That which should be done in an instant, a long square, fronting every way and firing from the head to the foot by the companies of grenadiers. If the attack of the enemy is decided on the side of the column of the right, the column of the left should then be a half circle to the right, it becoming the second line, and the carriages re-entering at the same time to the centre through the intervals; this would immediately restore the army again into three columns. If we wished to make a retreat in place of one at the left, it should be made at the right. According to the column which will form the first line we should place the cannon in the the intervals, and cause form the grenadiers into four squares to guard the flanks. Supposing (*fig. 3*) that the enemy should be arranged in battle order on a plain, having many natural meadows on the side of Illinois of an immense greatness—and that it was his design to attack you at the moment that the army debouched from the wood, in forming a square at the left to the platoons of the column to the right, and a quarter of a square at the right to the platoons of the column of the left, the two columns are at once formed in divisions by two companies in each division; and in debouching they will be able to form themselves in battle array by division.

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#### \* NOTES ON THE ORDER OF MARCH.

This disposition of M. Braddock was found among his papers at Belle river, but without any explanation of the

manœuvres which it behoved him to make of the columns, and containing only the names of the companies which were attached to every brigade of baggage; the column of the centre being composed of carriages of provisions, of his artillery and his munitions and other baggage, was divided into two brigades, which were distributed throughout his whole army, as they had need of them. Thus I will hazard my conjectures in regard to the different manœuvres which M. Braddock would have had it in his power to form the idea of making by his order of march. Every company, by the plan, appears to be divided into three platoons, of which I imagine the greatest of the three was commanded by the captain, the second by the lieutenant, the third, the most distant of carriages, by a sergeant,—the third not being in appearance but like two files of four or six deep. This sergeant's platoon might be designed to skirt the wood, break down the stockade and hold in check the light troops who leap upon the skirts of the wood. If the enemy appear in any great numbers, for fear of being attacked, they ought to form (*fig. 1*) platoons of column from the right one to the right; and from those of the column of the left one at the left; causing them to march immediately in advance from the line of the sergeant's platoon, which should make a long square, facing every way, and form at the head and rear by companies of grenadiers. If the attack of the enemy is decided from the side of the column of the right, the column of the left ought then to make a half circle to the right, which would then become the second line; and the carriages would pass at once through the intervals between the companies to place themselves in the rear of the column to the left, in order to leave free space between the two lines; thus, *vice versa*, if it is at the column of the left where the enemy makes his attack, if they wish to continue their march in advance, they ought to make to the whole force, one at the left, the carriages at the same time returning back through the intervals, which would imme-

diately replace the army into three columns. If they should wish to effect a retreat, in place of effecting it at the left, it ought to be made at the right. Immediately when it is ascertained that it is from the column of the right that the enemy would present himself to do battle, you ought then to introduce the artillery into the openings of that column, and you will make a quarter circle from the right to the grenadiers to protect the flanks of the first line. If it is the column of the left that is attacked, you will place the artillery there in the intervals, and the grenadiers will form a quarter circle to the left; the carriages passing at once becoming the column of the right, which will then be the second line. Supposing (*fig. 2*) that the enemy should be ranged in battle array in a plain, as there is often natural meadows on the side of Illinois, of an immense magnitude, and that it is his design to attack you at the moment when the army debouches from the wood, in making a quarter circle from the left to the platoons of the column of the right, and a quarter circle from the right to the platoons of the column of the left, the two columns are at once formed in divisions by companies; and in debouching from the wood you would be able to form at once in battle array through the centre, the companies of the column of the right placing it from the right to their first company, successively, in proportion as they debouched; and from the same companies of the column of the left, to their first company; a manœuvre which is in use at the passage of a bridge—the two companies at the head of the columns forming the centre of the line.

\* These conjectures, although in part repetitious, being in the original, we did not feel ourselves justified in abridging or omitting either of them.—ED.

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